

Why They Hate Us: An Empirical Study of Individuals' Anti-American Attitudes

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Prior to September 11, 2001, the United States was perceived as a predominant, nearly untouchable power. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War spelled the end of a bi-polar world and the beginning of the age of a single global superpower. The twentieth century was "the American century [. . .] not only in military, but also in economic, technological, and even cultural terms" (Krastev 5). However, in the years since September 11, hostility towards the United States has increased drastically. "Three years on, it seems that we are all anti-Americans. Hostility to the United States is deeper and broader than at any point in the last fifty years" (Zakaria 1). This increasing anti-Americanism can be seen around the globe, and has spurred lengthy journalistic and academic inquiries within the United States focused on "why they hate us," often without a specific definition of who *they* are or a definition of anti-American attitudes. While the lack of existing empirical research and the potential for furthering stereotypes are obvious deterrents from this type of research, examining anti-American attitudes on an individual level cross-nationally can provide preliminary answers to these important questions.

This paper will examine demographic and attitudinal information from around the world and address empirically why individuals seem to be increasingly anti-American. By shedding light on individual traits that contribute to anti-Americanism, policy makers may be able to develop strategies to target the root causes of anti-American attitudes. Examining these questions from an empirical perspective provides theoretical and practical support for policy decisions and may introduce more complete answers to questions regarding attitudes, terrorism, and global cohesion than questions asked and answered rhetorically on the evening news.

Process

Despite the passionate debate that has emerged about the causes of anti-Americanism, empirical research on anti-Americanism is surprisingly unavailable. There is an area of political writing devoted to explaining the causes and history of anti-Americanism. These include: a possible increase in American isolationism (Biden), a distraction from internal domestic problems (Rubin 2002; Fabbrini), a response to stereotypes and preconceptions about America that have evolved over time (Ceaser), a response to the war in Iraq (Pew 2004, *A Year After the Iraq War*), and a phenomenon partially generated by biased global news sources (Lambert). More recent works cover the history of anti-American sentiment around the globe (Rubin 2004, *Revel*), detail anti-American sentiment by region and country (Ross), and attempt to understand the phenomenon by comparing attitudes abroad through comparison. Some of this research points to exacerbating influences in the domestic United States (Hollander). However, no theoretical articles address why an *individual* is more or less likely to develop attitudes that are anti-American.

Since this study attempts to predict which individuals are likely to develop anti-American attitudes it draws on a number of areas of related theoretical literature to discern the relationship of the individual to anti-Americanism. However, there is a lack of a holistic, clearly defined literature related to the subject matter. The hypothesis will be guided by responses to globalization and imperialism, the potential religious causes of conflict, psychological causes of ethnocentric attitudes, and literature related to individual attitudes regarding foreign states and foreign policy. Combining these theoretical areas opens up a window into understanding individuals and their attitudes towards America, despite the lack of a more general theoretical approach.

Propositions

In order to empirically test individuals' attitudes towards America, useful survey data must be used that is both cross-national and includes questions about the United States. The Pew Research Center has attempted to glean attitudes about U.S. policies and positions from over 38,000 people from 44 nations via annual studies reporting on the critical assessments of individuals regarding key policies and general impressions of the United States. Using their 2002 data, this paper will address consistent patterns of anti-Americanism that are not limited to country or geographic region, but rather to individuals. Questions related to individuals and their demographic traits will be the independent variables, while an attitudinal scale for anti-Americanism based on survey questions will make up the dependent variable. This should uncover trends based on identity that create a greater likelihood of anti-Americanism that is separate from nationality.

Previous Research

Anti-Americanism is first and foremost a particular type of prejudice directed at Americans. Rubin defines the phenomenon as:

an antagonism to the United States that is systematic, seeing it as completely and inevitably evil; a view that greatly exaggerates America's shortcomings; a deliberate misrepresentation of the nature or policies of the United States for political purposes; [and a] misperception of American society, policies, or goals which falsely portrays them as ridiculous or malevolent (Rubin 2004, ix).

This stereotype of Americans is likely due to an oversimplification of the complexities that define "America." Individuals often oversimplify and distort issues by thinking in categories (Beck). Since this categorization is a building block of prejudice, it is necessary to examine the sources of prejudice, and the theoretical literature that details why people identify with a particular group in developing attitudes.

Anti-Americanism: A Response to Imperialism?

In this context, it is important to consider the historical effects of globalization and theories addressing the frustrated response to modernization in any discussion of anti-Americanism. This frustration is manifested via aggression towards the United States. Many theorists claim frustration emerges when mobilization and modernization outpace assimilation within a particular country or culture. Modernization, in many cases, causes social mobilization at an unprecedented pace; creating expectations of social mobility and the breakdown of traditional order at the same time communication and transportation resources are revolutionized. The result is an increased awareness of poverty and inadequacy of resources, or a desire to grasp the benefits of globalization. This "revolution of rising expectations" is quickly met by the reality of slow economic growth and unequal distribution of benefits results in a "revolution of rising frustration" which can, in turn, lead to aggression or anti-Americanism (Taras and Ganguly 11).

Gurr, who best known for developing the theory of relative deprivation in *Why Men Rebel*, further developed this theory. Relative deprivation theory suggests that revolution and rebellion are caused when there is a "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value expectancies in a society" (Taras and Ganguly 15). According to Gurr, people recognize general deprivation, and become aware that their own circumstances are not universal, discern that their own deprivation is unfair, and decide that political action must be taken to end their plight (Taras and Ganguly). While anti-Americanism does not necessarily lead to rebellion or specific political action, the same cognitive processes, triggered by an individual realization of one's relative deprivation, is likely.

Other research suggests that especially in Arab nations, anti-Americanism is a product

of manipulative and controlling governments that “use anti-Americanism as a foil to distract public attention from other, far more serious problems with those societies” (Rubin 2002, 1). Many governments take advantage of rising expectations, globalization, and relative deprivation by blaming slow economic progress and problems on the United States. If this theory holds true, then many people interviewed in the Pew Survey may be discontent with their life situation and blame the United States more than their own government for their hardship, especially in the Middle East. In order to control for this scenario, the Middle East will be added as a control variable.

Religion As a Source of Conflict

In his controversial work *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel Huntington identifies religion as one of the primary sources of conflict global conflict (Huntington). Huntington categorizes conflict as a clash of civilizations, which he defines as the broadest cultural framework for identity. “Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious, and civilizational [...] and the fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics” (Huntington 125). A great deal of support for religion as a cultural basis for civilization conflict emerges from recent conflict between what Huntington calls the “Islamic World” and the “West.” If Huntington’s thesis is correct, and religion forms a basis for political and cultural identity, than religious differences are partly responsible for global conflict and aggression. This is a strong indicator that Anti-Americanism may be fueled by religious differences.

However, others have been critical of Huntington’s thesis, despite agreement that the historical relationship between Islam and Western style Christianity has not been promising (Esposito 46). Instead of religion, Piscatori attributes conflict to more traditional patterns of nation-state behavior. “The astute observer of international relations will note that there is no such thing as monolithic Islam [...] Islam has become nationalized, producing as many Islams as there are countries with Muslim majorities.” According to Piscatori, national identity would often trump religious and cultural identity, especially due to the lack of consistency within faith traditions. Given the controversy in the literature, this study will examine if, on an individual level, religion has an impact in shaping attitudes regarding “other” civilizations.

Social Identity Theory

Conflict results only if individuals separate their individual identity from the source of their perceived problem. In the 1970s Henri Tajfel developed a sophisticated model for how subjects identify themselves in relation to others, which became known as the “minimal group paradigm” (Tajfel). Tajfel attempted to recreate the first meeting between an individual and their “alter” in a state of nature. This involved minimizing group identification, history, competition over resources, distrust, self-interest, or contact (Mercer). Tajfel divided his subjects into two groups arbitrarily and studied the subjects’ decisions regarding fairness, maximum joint gain, relative gain, and absolute gain towards their own group (what Tajfel calls the “in-group”) and the other group (the “out-group”) (Mercer). The results showed that individuals consistently favored their own group and tried to maximize the difference in scores between the in-group and the out-group (Fisher). Conflict and cooperation is decided based on this initial perception of “self” and “other.”

In order to identify self, the categorization of other is necessary. Not only is a self and an other identified, but the definition of self is also associated with positive images to reinforce a more positive social identity in comparison to others. This is referred to as a “universal desire for self esteem” (Mercer). Discriminatory behavior, and presumably anti-American sentiment, can be found in subjects’ efforts to give their own group a greater rela-

tive value (Mercer). Unfortunately, social identity theory does not provide a key for which self-categorizations are the most important, and therefore the basis for identity.

Psychological Causes of Ethnic Conflict

In addition to research on social identity theory, theories that explain the psychological causes of ethnic conflict provide further insight into individuals' anti-American attitudes. Sumner developed some of his first theory using in-group and out-group characteristics in defining what he called the "universal syndrome of ethnocentrism" (Levine 7). Robert Levine and Donald Campbell use Sumner's research combined with the work of other theorists to generate a list of attitudes and behaviors consistent with the in-group and out-group, and empirically test these theories against each other to determine a better roadmap to ethnocentric conflict. They suggested that the in-group generally sees the out-group as contemptible, immoral, inferior, weak, resists cooperation, lacks obedience to out-group authorities, blames the out-group for in-group problems, and is fearful and distrustful of the out-group (Levine). This ingroup-outgroup mentality could be applied to anti-Americanism, a form of ethnocentrism that focuses on a particular out-group.

After testing these theories, Levine and Campbell found areas of unchallenged agreement amongst theorists. They concluded that competition over resources generates conflict, and could potentially cause anti-Americanism. In addition, reciprocation or perceived reciprocation of hostilities generates aggression. The tendency for in-groups to magnify cognitively their differences from the out-group and exaggerate the out-group flaws generates further conflict. Finally, Levine and Campbell concluded that complex societies generally contain greater ethnocentrism (Levine). All of these theoretical consistencies are relatively straightforward, except for the last proposition. Since regions with longer histories have developed more complex group structures and coordination, they propose that this results in more out-group hostility, based on a longer history of distinguishing those that "belonged" with "outsiders."

Theory Regarding Individuals

To identify which individual traits shape individual conceptions of themselves and "America," this paper will turn to piecemeal research in other areas. Existing research shows that isolationism generally appeals to the poorly educated, economically deprived, and geographically isolated individuals, who are also generally poorly informed regarding global events. (Sniderman and Citrin). This suggests that a person's educational level and economic status are highly influential factors in defining differences between themselves and "others." This is consistent with Lambert's work suggesting that news sources and bias of news media impacts the misunderstandings between the United States and the rest of the world (Lambert). Where individuals obtain their news information, their education level, and economic status will likely directly affect their attitudes towards the United States.

An individual's history of travel to other states or familial contact individuals have outside their own nation, especially with the United States, adds insight to the creation of individual attitudes. Research suggests that foreign travel on the part of businessmen tends to reinforce previously held conceptions regarding the visited state and peoples. However, such travel also makes individuals aware of the differences between their own identity and opinions and those of others, which can result in greater understanding (Pool, Keller, Bauer). Logically, an isolated individual is likely to have different attitudes towards America than a well-traveled individual from the same nation.

The existing literature further suggests that foreign policy attitudes differ between men and women. Pomper drew conclusions that elections in the United States in both 1980 and 1984 were influenced by a gender gap over opinions regarding war and foreign policy between men and women (Togeby). Some researchers have concluded that on 6% of issues

involving force in foreign policy between 1964 and 1983, there was a consistent gender difference in opinions (Togebly). However, Lisa Togebly re-examined the issue using a different country, Denmark, and found that, “differences between the genders are not large, but they are consistent and significant” (Togebly 388). Given a slight gender gap in foreign policy attitudes in multiple countries, it will be important to note if gender plays a role in anti-American sentiment.

The wide range of existing research on globalization, the psychological sources of ethnic conflict, social identity theory and as well as indications from existing research indicating the sources of individual attitudes creates a compelling case for examining individuals’ levels of anti-Americanism.

Data and Hypothesis

The Pew Research Center’s data covers individuals in 44 countries cross nationally¹. A five-question Likert scale was developed to measure the dependent variable, anti-Americanism². Using questions in the survey, independent variables were selected focusing on an individual’s sources of news, gender, age, travel background, relatives living in foreign nations, religious activity, education, employment status, availability of necessities, income level, amenities, marital status, children, self-identification on a political spectrum, and population of their town³. Each variable was measured by one or more questions from the Pew Research Center’s survey, although many had differing scales of measurement.

Existing research allows extrapolation of a number of preliminary hypotheses:

1. A lower education level increases individuals’ anti-American attitudes.
2. Lower levels of income generate greater anti-Americanism.
3. Economic deprivation (as measured by amenities and necessities) results in greater levels of anti-Americanism
4. A gender gap exists between male and female levels of anti-Americanism, with males presenting a higher level of anti-Americanism
5. Rural areas will contain individuals with higher levels of anti-Americanism
6. Traveling and exposure to other nations/cultures, especially the United States, will generate lower levels of anti-Americanism.
7. Muslim and non-Christian faiths will coincide with higher levels of Anti-Americanism.
8. The lack of an international news source (or the presence of less-sophisticated news sources) will result in higher levels of Anti-Americanism.

Testing these hypotheses and teasing out other unpredicted relationships between an individual’s level of anti-Americanism and their identity was done utilizing a number of statistical tools. Bivariate correlations illustrated connections between the dependent and independent variables, while controlling for statistical significance. Finally, linear regression analysis was used to uncover direct relationships between identity and anti-Americanism drawing from a single survey question for each independent variable⁴.

The variables for the study were chosen without bias to particular survey questions and, as a result, data problems emerged when independent variables were selected from the existing research. Each country had the ability to exclude or reword survey questions⁵. In addition, the Pew Research Center used a variety of coding techniques, which were mostly consistent, but occasionally varied widely from country to country. For example, comparing

¹ Appendix 1

² Appendix 2

³ Appendix 2

⁴ These were usually the strongest questions with a statistically significant correlation to Anti-Americanism or the only questions that acted as a measure of a particular variable. See Table 12 for the regression model.

⁵ Appendix 1

income levels cross-nationally became impossible, because the data was coded according to a scale of country specific currencies. However, income and economic deprivation were measured using the series of questions addressing basic needs in all countries survey, and amenities in lesser-developed countries. A similar problem emerged when a variation in the coded responses was discovered regarding an individual's occupation, making cross-national comparisons too difficult for this study. Knowing these two facts about any individual in the study has the potential to affect the results, but since the measurements are impossible to compare, they have been dropped from the research. The last coding problem was addressed by combining the responses to one of the education measures through a recode, allowing a comparison regarding level of education to be drawn from the data set.

The other difficulty of this study is the inability to account completely for an individual's response to global events or any psychological trauma they may have experienced. An excellent example of psychological effects altering the results would be individuals' with low self-esteem. As Sniderman and Citron point out in their research, individuals with low self-esteem, "are likely to see their external environment as confused and threatening" (410). However, individual psychology alone does not tell a complete story. Hopefully, the data will show connections between demographics and eliminate statistical noise caused by significant world events, and provide insight into causes of anti-Americanism separate from individual psychology.

An individual's anti-American attitudes might be amplified by country-level contact with the United States. For that reason, control variables were added for region. Controls were also established to remove any bias based on Muslim/non-Muslim to further eliminate noise in the dataset caused by the Middle East that was suggested in the literature. The final control was developed to replace the gender variable once it was found to be largely insignificant. These controls were added to the regression analysis.

Results and Analysis

The results turned up high levels of statistical significance, but with relatively weak correlations⁶. In terms of the first hypothesis, education was found to have a negative correlation to anti-Americanism (Table 1)⁷, confirming Sniderman and Citron's theory that low levels of education correspond with higher levels of isolationism. Additionally, those that completed their education at a younger age had higher levels of anti-Americanism (Table 1), which was also statistically significant. Both of these findings strengthen the argument that ethnocentric and isolationist attitudes are less prevalent among the educated. In this study, isolationist attitudes are measured vis a vis the dependent variable.

In terms of economic deprivation, the presence of necessities (Table 2) and amenities in lesser-developed countries resulted in positive correlations (Table 3). This was surprising, as it ran contradictory to the hypothesis, which generally suggested that lower economic status would generate greater levels of anti-Americanism. The data instead marginally suggests that the presence of basic necessities and amenities encourages anti-Americanism. While this seems to run contrary to existing research, it does not rule out theories of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation theory does not specify which possessions or economic position create a self-awareness of deprivation. Globalization potentially creates expectations above and beyond basic necessities and amenities. Instead of defining deprivation by the lack of food, clothing and shelter, it is defined by the absence of prosperity on an American economic scale. Since economic status could only be measured using limited

⁶ Often variables were coded where "no" responses corresponded with a value of "2" and "yes" as a value of one. The data is presented in its original form, before being inversely interpreted for this data problem. This accounts for the inconsistencies between the data tables and the findings

⁷ Tables in Appendix 4

indicators, the results of the correlation on these variables cannot provide a complete picture, and ideally further study on income levels, relative deprivation, and economic status in relation to anti-Americanism should be conducted.

Hypothesis number four, predicting a gender gap for anti-Americanism, was not supported by the results. In this case, the nonparametric correlation between the independent and dependent was not statistically significant (Table 4). However, when the gender variable was analyzed by region, gender was significant in both North and South America, and the Middle East (Table 5 & 6). In the Americas, women were very slightly more anti-American than men, whereas in the Middle East this was almost the exact opposite. Given the contradictory literature regarding foreign policy attitudes and gender, it is not surprising that two different regions had inverse gender relationships to anti-Americanism. However, it is important to remember that neither correlation was very strong.

Analysis of the population size of the town confirmed hypothesis five. Here again the correlation was very weak (Table 7). Individuals that lived in smaller towns were found to be slightly more likely to have anti-American attitudes. However, some of the countries had variations on this question, and since not all of the states in the study were included in this variable due to reformatted questions, this relationship may be stronger if given further research. Regardless, it seems to suggest once again that Sniderman and Citrin were correct in proposing that more isolated individuals have more isolationist attitudes.

In terms of traveling abroad, contact with the United States seemed to have a stronger impact on anti-Americanism than many of the other variables. While the time elapsed since travel was found to be statistically insignificant, travel to the United States was negatively correlated to anti-Americanism (Table 8). In addition, the presence of relatives or friends abroad, especially in the United States, significantly decreased the level of anti-Americanism. The statistically significant, negative correlation between the presence of friends and relatives abroad in the United States and anti-Americanism was the strongest relationship uncovered in this study (Table 8). This reinforces the theory that travel has an impact on foreign policy attitudes, but since the existing research states that travel usually reinforced existing preconceptions, the findings do not contribute extensively to existing literature. However, the extant literature did not address contact with friends or relatives abroad. It was included in this study as part of the travel abroad category, since contact with friends and neighbors in many cases may be the only international contact individuals have. It is interesting that the presence of friends and relatives was a stronger determinant of anti-Americanism than personal travel to the United States. However, this is easily explained since those that have friends and relatives in the United States may consider their contacts part of their "in-group." Including Americans in one's own framing of identity would clearly lessen the likelihood of anti-Americanism according to social identity theory and the self-esteem hypothesis.

Hypothesis seven addressed Huntington's thesis, that religion generates conflict, on the individual level. The hypothesis focused on those with non-Christian faiths, specifically Muslims, who are historically the most likely to come into conflict with the United States. As individuals self-identified their religious background, bivariate correlations could not be run on the nominal level variables. Instead, the mean levels of Americanism for each religion were compared⁸. As shown, Muslim and Eastern Orthodox individuals have higher average levels of anti-Americanism than the other religions (Table 9). As Eastern Orthodoxy is a form of Christianity, these results are somewhat surprising, until one considers the history of the Cold War and Communism in the same region of the world where

⁸ This variable was also recoded to combine similar faith categories. Thus, all denominations of Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, etc. were combined. Faith traditions that did not fit in these categories were placed in "other," and the respondents who identified as "no faith" were combined with atheist/no religion.

Eastern Orthodoxy is prominent. The historical conflict between the former Soviet Union and the United States likely explains the higher levels of anti-Americanism. However, the same historical conflict exists between the United States and Islamic states. Before conclusions are drawn about the impact of faith, specifically the Muslim religion, regression analysis will compare the significance of this variable to the others.

Determining the importance of religious activity to individuals was the other method of analyzing religion as an explanatory variable. If Huntington's thesis is correct, highly active religious participants are more likely to identify themselves by their faith. To test this, the impact of their participation in religious traditions was measured against anti-Americanism. The bivariate correlation shows that, in both Muslim and non-Muslim faiths, as respondents were more active in prayer, anti-Americanism dropped slightly. This corresponds with lower levels of anti-Americanism among participants who identified religion as important in their life (Table 10). While these correlations are extremely weak, they suggest that religious participation does not generate higher levels of Anti-Americanism. However, that does not disprove Huntington's theory that religion helps to shape identity, and therefore causes conflict.

Hypothesis eight dealt with sources of news, by drawing on the work of Lambert, who suggests that biases in foreign news and sources of news are part of the impetus for anti-American attitudes. Unfortunately, most of the results for questions that focused on sources of news resulted in contradictory or extremely weak correlations (Table 11). The most important result was that people who watched an international news channel showed lower levels of anti-Americanism (Table 11). There was a minute relationship between less sophisticated news sources (newspapers) versus the internet resulting in higher levels of anti-Americanism. However, this correlation was not robust and could have been inadvertently confounded by the presence of the internet as a news source, which indirectly also asked respondents if they had access to the internet. Therefore, this weak correlation may be the result of exposure to the internet versus non-exposure. Regardless, the findings regarding an international news channel suggest that Lambert is correct, sources of news and their biases may in fact have an impact on anti-American attitudes around the world.

Regression

Now that each independent variable has been analyzed against the dependent variable, the relative importance of each variable can be determined using regression analysis. For each variable, one measurement question was selected for the regression, usually the variable with the strongest correlation to anti-Americanism. Controls were then added to eliminate noise in the data caused by regions and the Muslim faith.

Gender, being statistically insignificant, was recoded into a control for the purposes of the regression model. Not surprisingly, given the relatively weak correlations in the data, the dummy variables had the highest standardized betas (Table 10). The largest relationship was the African dummy variable, which was negatively related to anti-Americanism. This is probably due to the absence of US colonial history in that region, combined with the influx of US aide to Africa. The Muslim/Non-Muslim and Middle East dummy variables were almost identical, with betas of .166 and .164, respectively. This showed that while the Muslim faith may have an impact on Anti-Americanism, it is almost impossible to separate this from attitudes based on region or nation, neither proving nor disproving either side of the theoretical debate over religions importance in conflict.

Overall, the regression model confirmed the direction of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables suggested by the bivariate correlations, and also confirmed the weak nature of the relationships. The R squared value, while weak, was still statistically significant. While the weak statistical relationships are not ideal, in a global survey of attitudes on this scale, weak numbers are to be expected.

Further Research

Ideally, comparable data for income level and education would have been available to provide a more complete picture of the economic relationship to anti-Americanism, but that was not possible. Additionally, a more comprehensive scale for anti-Americanism could be developed to account for relative deprivation. There is a distinct possibility that the lack of strength in the results is due to the chosen measurement of the dependent variable. This new Likert scale would need to include questions about globalization and imperialism in general in order to better test relative deprivation theories and include questions that directly address the United States, like the ones used in the present study.

In order to better address the origins of anti-Americanism, more theory needs to be developed that directly addresses the phenomenon, in order to support the suggested empirical continuations. As indicated in the literature review, this process should begin by tying together existing literature related to globalization and ethnocentrism theories, social identity theory, and theories related to individual attitudes. A more comprehensive literature, with testable hypothesis, would generate further studies of anti-Americanism allowing for more substantial empirical results.

Conclusion

Since September 11, 2001, American policymakers and citizens have been hypothesizing about why people in other nations can develop such strong animosity towards the United States. However, political theorists and empirical studies have failed to provide a cohesive answer to this problem. This study attempted to fill in gaps left in the literature, and to tie together theories in an empirical analysis of individuals around the world in order to determine which of their characteristics provoke anti-American attitudes. While early correlations showed promise in explaining relationships, the final regression analysis proved the relationships between the independent variables (identity demographics) and dependent variable (anti-Americanism) to be weak at best. However, even weak relationships that are statistically significant point to the potential for continuing research on anti-Americanism.

Appendix 1:

Data from 45 Countries:

1. Angola
2. Argentina
3. Bangladesh
4. Bolivia
5. Brazil
6. Bulgaria
7. Canada*
8. China*
9. Ivory Coast
10. Czech Republic*
11. Egypt*
12. France*
13. Germany*
14. Ghana*
15. Guatemala*
16. Honduras*
17. India*
18. Indonesia*
19. Italy
20. Japan*
21. Kenya
22. South Korea*
23. Mali
24. Mexico*
25. Morocco (No data)
26. Nigeria*
27. Pakistan*
28. Peru
29. Philippines*
30. Poland*
31. Russia
32. Senegal
33. Slovak Republic*
34. South Africa
35. Tanzania*
36. Turkey
37. Uganda*
38. Great Britain*
39. Ukraine
40. United States*
41. Uzbekistan*
42. Venezuela
43. Vietnam*
44. Lebanon*
45. Jordan*

* Indicates one or more questions related to my independent variables was modified or not asked within that country.

Appendix 2: Variables and Corresponding Survey Questions

Dependent: Anti-Americanism

Questions 61b, 62, 65 (recoded), 67, 68

Independents: Identity Variables

Sources of News:

Questions 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 abc,

Gender:

Question 73

Age:

Question 74

Travel and Contact Abroad:

Questions 75, 76, 77, 78.

Religion:

Questions 79 (not asked in China)

80 (Muslim in Islamic Countries Only), modified in Tanzania, not asked in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon.

81 (Non-Muslim or non-Islamic Countries), modified in Czech Republic, Great Britain, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Slovak Republic, South Korea, and Turkey. Not asked in China, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon

82 (Muslim in Islamic Countries Only), not asked in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tanzania
83, modified in Great Britain, Mexico, Poland and South Korea. Not asked in China, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Education Level:

Question 84 (Recoded to standardize)

Question 85, modified in China, not asked in Egypt and US

Employment Status-Dropped from Study

Question 86, modified in China, India, South Korea, and US.

Availability of Necessities:

Question 87 abc, not asked in Egypt

Income Level-Dropped from Study

Question 88

LDC's only:

Availability of amenities (Egypt not included)

Question 89 a (not asked in China, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic) b, c (not asked in China), d, e

Population:

Question 97, modified in Canada, China, France, Germany, and Vietnam. Not asked in Egypt, Great Britain, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Lebanon, South Korea, Uganda, and US.

Appendix 3

Table 1: Education

Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	AA
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000
		N	22999
	global education	Correlation Coefficient	-.034**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999
	Have formal education only: How old were you (will you be) when you completed your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education?	Correlation Coefficient	-.088**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 2: Availability of Necessities

Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	AA
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000
		N	22999
	Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food your family needed?	Correlation Coefficient	.049**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999
	Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to pay for medical and health care your family needed?	Correlation Coefficient	.048**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999
	Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy clothing your family needed?	Correlation Coefficient	.039**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 3: Amenities (Lesser Developed Countries Only)

Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	AA
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000
		N	22999
	LDC only: Does your household have electricity?	Correlation Coefficient	-.088**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	19103
	LDC only: Does your household have a working TV?	Correlation Coefficient	-.039**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	19972
	LDC only: Does your household have running water in the house?	Correlation Coefficient	-.092**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	19972
	LDC only: Does your household have a flush toilet?	Correlation Coefficient	-.100**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	19972
	LDC only: Does your household have a car?	Correlation Coefficient	-.004
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.614
		N	19972

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4: Gender

			AA
Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	22999
Gender		Correlation Coefficient	.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.995
		N	22999

Table 5: Gender Region 1, The Americas

			AA
Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	4958
Gender		Correlation Coefficient	.042**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.003
		N	4958

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 6: Gender Region 5, The Middle East

			AA
Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	4026
Gender		Correlation Coefficient	-.047**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.003
		N	4026

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 7: Population

			AA
Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	22999
About how many people live in the place the interview was conducted?		Correlation Coefficient	-.035**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	17092

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 8: Travel and Contact Abroad

Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	AA
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000
		N	22999
	In the last five years have you traveled to another country?	Correlation Coefficient	.007
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.308
		N	22999
	Have you ever traveled to the US?	Correlation Coefficient	.052*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999
	Do you have friends or relatives who live in another country that you write to, telephone or visit regularly?	Correlation Coefficient	.076*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999
	If have friends or relatives who live in another country that write to, telephone or visit regularly only; Do any of the friends or relatives you write to, telephone or visit regularly live in the US?	Correlation Coefficient	.129*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	8958

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 9




Table 10: Religious Activity

Spearman's rho	AA	Correlation Coefficient	AA
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000
		N	22999
	Do you consider yourself as belonging to a particular religion? If yes, which one?	Correlation Coefficient	.126**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999
	Muslim in Islamic country only: How often, if at all, do you pray?	Correlation Coefficient	-.070**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	4773
	Non-Muslim in Islamic country and non-Islamic countries only: People practice their religion in many different ways. Outside of attending religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week, or	Correlation Coefficient	.153**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	15379
	Muslim in Islamic country only: How often, if at all, do you fast?	Correlation Coefficient	-.006
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.666
		N	4773
	How important is religion in your life?	Correlation Coefficient	.097**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	20719

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Table 11: Sources of News and Information

Spearman's rho	Where do you most often turn to get news about national and international issues?	Correlation Coefficient	AA
		Sig. (2-tailed)	-.043**
		N	22999
	If has most frequent source only: What is your next most frequent source of news about national and international issues?	Correlation Coefficient	.033**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22889
	Do you watch an international news channel such as (make specific to each country)?	Correlation Coefficient	.089**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000
		N	22999
	AA	Correlation Coefficient	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.
		N	22999

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Appendix 4: Regression Model

Table 12: Regression Model for Anti-Americanism

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.393	.154	.154	1.97668

ANOVA for Anti-Americanism

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	16650.721	11	1513.702	387.406	.000
	Residual	91213.093	23344	3.907		
	Total	107863.8	23355			

Coefficients for Anti-Americanism

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	8.288	.122		67.926	.000
	Where do you most often turn to get news about national and international issues?	.136	.012	.071	11.102	.000
	How old were you at your last birthday?	6.992E-03	.001	.051	8.077	.000
	Have you ever traveled to the US?	.355	.047	.048	7.496	.000
	muslim dummy variable	.790	.039	.166	20.016	.000
	gender dummy variable	-1.79E-02	.026	-.004	-.685	.493
	global education	-2.04E-02	.006	-.022	-3.414	.001
	dummy region 2 Europe	.343	.042	.063	8.097	.000
	dummy region 3 Asia	-.264	.044	-.047	-5.996	.000
	dummy region 4 Africa	-1.084	.042	-.218	-25.540	.000
	dummy region 5 Middle East	.937	.055	.164	16.987	.000
	Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food your family needed?	5.943E-02	.027	.014	2.170	.030

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