

## ANTI-AMERICANISM AROUND THE WORLD

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### Abstract

*Anti-American attitudes can be found in individuals all over the world. The causes for it relate to both internal and external sources, which is why a unifying theory based on structure, culture, and institutions must be used to analyze this issue. Particularly important in individuals' attitudes are the following variables: nationalist sentiments; the legitimacy of one's government; U.S. military, economic, and political intervention in one's home country; feelings about democratic values; economic deprivation; and a number of demographics. By using a survey of over thirty thousand respondents from forty countries, we will hopefully more deeply understand what makes individuals harbor anti-American sentiments. Results indicate that government legitimacy and a number of economic indicators are the most important in terms of determining anti-Americanism, showing that a mix of internal factors and external factors are most important in determining opinion of the United States.*

## Introduction

Anti-Americanism seems to be the *modus operandi* for much of the world. Annoyance, contempt, and even hatred can be found all over the globe, and things only seem to be getting worse. It manifests itself in protests ranging from peaceful to violent, comments that can be snide, vicious, or even dangerous, and sometimes in violence against American embassies, soldiers, and civilians. It is not fair to say that anti-Americanism always results in violence, but it is still a topic that must be discussed. By looking at this issue empirically, we will hopefully delve deeper than the simple explanations that posit that our unilateral actions, exorbitant wealth, and actions of our Presidents cause Anti-Americanism, and find out which individuals are anti-American and why. Because politicians all over the world denounce the United States' wealth, decadence, and supposed moral decay in order to bolster public opinion of themselves, it only makes sense to examine this issue on the individual level, and to make changes that will affect people at an individual level. This might help us understand the effect we can plausibly have on anti-Americanism around the world.

A deeper look at this issue would need to look at the extent of American influence throughout the world. This influence could be related to American culture, economics, or the military, or, more likely, a combination of all three. The United States' history of unilateral military action and economic domination throughout the world has sowed discontent for many years, and the U.S. may now be seeing more of those repercussions and consequences. Anti-Americanism could also be due to internal problems of countries and their leaders' attempts to unite the country through the creation of a scapegoat or common enemy. As a superpower, the United States is the perfect target for this kind of strategy.

This paper will also try to capture a unique aspect of anti-Americanism, or more generally, opinion of the United States. Since the survey it is based on comes from 2002, the data collected come from the time before the United States' invasion of Iraq. By looking at this period, we run the risk of not including a major factor in anti-Americanism, but at the same time it will perhaps better capture the essence of anti-Americanism. Without such an easy target and reason for dislike as the Iraq war, it is possible that respondents had a relatively unbiased opinion of the United States.

## Literature Review

Before looking more closely at anti-Americanism, it must be carefully defined. This can be a difficult process, but successful attempts have been made by scholars. In some literature, a loose concept of anti-Americanism is used. In one example, anti-Americanism is defined as something "compromising both the criticism of the American system as such (its global power, its model of democracy) and of specific foreign policy" (Fabbrini 2004, 80). This paper will follow in that vein, as will be seen by our parsimonious yet accurate measure of anti-Americanism.

In examining factors that explain levels of Anti-American sentiment around the world, a broad theoretical approach is necessary. However, we will also look more specifically at anti-American theory, particularly what are the sources and causes of it. These sources can be broken down into external and internal sources. External sources of anti-Americanism are often forms of "resistance" resulting from U.S. cultural, military, political, and economic infiltration into a foreign country (Tai et al 1973, 456). In the Middle East, for example, America has a long history of conflict with the Muslim world. It began in the 1700s with the Barbary pirates, who seized American ships, sent our sailors to slavery, and then demanded exorbitant ransoms for the

men. Today, America's military, foreign aid, and religion-based friendship with Israel causes a great deal of anti-American sentiment, especially when conservative Arab governments attempt to have good relations with the U.S. (Parker 1988, 47). In Europe, external sources have more to deal with the U.S. power and unilateral action, as well as cultural infiltration. Perhaps this can be best be seen from the comments of the French foreign minister in 1995, who called the U.S. a hyper-power, saying that the U.S. supremacy has "extended to every aspect of the world's economy, technology, language, and culture" (Fabbrini 2004, 88).

While resistance to America's ever widening influence is one cause of anti-Americanism, much of it also has to do with foreign countries use of America as a scapegoat. According to Tai et al, individuals under hard conditions will attempt to "direct their hostility toward relatively weak and blameless targets." While the U.S. is neither weak nor blameless in many cases, the U.S. is certainly an easy target for criticism from politicians who in most cases will not experience any sort of retaliation from the U.S. This process is actively promoted by elites, who often seek to bolster their domestic position by pursuing foreign policies of conflict (Tai et al 1973, 459). Again, the Middle East provides a good example. It is quite popular for the region as a whole to blame America for many different problems (Rubin 2001, 1), but specific events and issues often come into play. In the 1980s, a U.S. hostage was taken in Beirut, not because of any "inherent religious or ethnic antipathy," but because of a "lack of effective governmental authority" which led to Lebanon using the United States as a scapegoat. According to Parker, the reason this event occurred was not because of Lebanese hatred for something America was doing, but rather the lack of government legitimacy and a negative influence from Iran (Parker 1988, 51). We will explore this idea of government legitimacy later, but for now we can see some of the internal stresses that cause anti-Americanism.

Although these categories of external and internal sources of anti-Americanism are helpful to think about, the case is never simply one or the other. Indeed, "neither U.S. presence nor internal stress is alone sufficient to generate anti-Americanism (Tai et al 1973, 460). Further complicating these issues is the unit of analysis of this paper, which is the individual. While this paper will look at the influence America has on countries as a whole, we cannot only use these macro-sources of anti-Americanism. According to Parker, opinions of individuals "depend very much on the personal situation of the individual in question and on what his or her personal interests are" (Parker 1988, 51).

Since we cannot simply look at the issues in terms of external or internal sources, this paper will use a combination of structural, cultural, and institutional approaches. In terms of a structural approach, Parker identifies the following demographic variables as important: income, education, race and or minority status, and gender. (Due to the constraints of the survey being used, this paper will only be examining income and gender.) We will also look at the relative deprivation of respondents, which is both an internal stress but also the result of external causes such as globalization and imperialism (Taras and Ganguly 11).

In terms of a cultural approach, nationalist sentiments, democratic values, and religion will be examined. To understand the importance of nationalism, we can look at a survey done on the individual level in Panama. This survey, and the resulting paper, found that higher levels of nationalism led to lower levels of support for the U.S. (Perez 1999, 10). Although this was one country, it will be interesting to see if this result applies to the rest of the world. This survey also looked at democratic values, which was a particularly important factor in Panama because of George H.W. Bush's repeated use of the argument that the invasion of Panama would "restore democracy," so it is important to understand how the public feels about democratic values. This

is also important in today's world, especially because of the world's seeming disdain for the U.S.'s unilateral attempts to spread democracy. The Panama study seemed inconclusive on this point, but others did not. In a different study, an author found that the measure of democracy was statistically insignificant in a regression model involving the ability of the foreign aid distribution to affect UN voting (Wang 1999, 207). In this paper we will hopefully see more clearly whether support for democratic values have an effect on individuals' anti-American sentiments.

Finally, this paper incorporates an institutional approach by including variables such as government legitimacy, whether the United States military has intervened in particular country and other measures of U.S. presence. One of the best measures of U.S. presence found in the literature was a scale based on seven indicators. These indicators included U.S. loans and grants to the country, U.S. military assistance and aid, U.S. military bases, U.S. direct investment, proportional trade with the U.S., U.S. private economic presence, and U.S. tourism presence (Tai et al 1973, 464-5). In terms of government legitimacy, the Panama survey gives us another good clue. According to Perez, support for the political system is very important in Panama in regard to their opinion of the United States for two reasons. The first and most important reason is that the United States installed the government. The second reason is that government legitimacy encourages content citizens, which then discourages the government from blaming the United States for any domestic troubles, an idea we have already seen in internal stress and scapegoating (Perez 1999, 15). While the idea of the U.S. government creating the government will not apply to most of the countries in this survey, government legitimacy's effect on citizen contentment will be very important.

While examining these variables, it will be necessary to keep track of and control for region. Literature that speaks of Middle-Eastern and Latin American anti-Americanism has already been mentioned (Rubin 2001, Parker 1988, Perez 1999), but other regions and countries are important too in terms of developing their own personal anti-Americanism. In South Korea, for example, pro-democracy movements took place. During these, however, public opinion of the United States decreased and many of the largest protests occurred at or near American structures such as the Embassy and Chamber of Commerce (Gi-Wook Shin 1996, 787). Even among our great allies in Western Europe, there is plenty of peace protests protesting NATO and the U.S. that rightly or wrongly are often construed as anti-American acts (Markovits 1985, 3). Other scholars point to anti-Americanism's prevalence in many third world countries, including many of the countries of Africa (Rubinstein & Smith 1988). From these examples, it is clear that region plays an important part of anti-Americanism, and must be considered along with any other variables.

## **Data and Hypotheses**

Based on the literature, this paper seeks to understand the effects that a number of independent variables have on Anti-American sentiment around the world, as well as some demographic control variables. These factors include an individual's: (1) level of nationalist sentiments, (2) feelings of legitimacy for one's national government, (3) support for democratic values, (4) level of economic deprivation, (5) a dummy variable measuring whether the United States military has intervened in one's country since 1964 and other measures of military influence, (6) overall economic influence, and (7) other demographic control variables. Where possible, the paper uses multiple measures of United States influence, especially in terms of

economic and military influence. Answering these questions is a complex process but the following describes the approach in detail.

This approach will be applied to a survey and data set produced by the Pew Global Attitudes Project entitled *What the World Thinks in 2002*. The unit of analysis for the data set is individuals from around the world. Originally, the data set had 38,623 respondents from forty-four different countries (see Appendix for a list of countries). However, four countries (China, Egypt, the U.S., and Vietnam) were cut because some of the questions germane to this paper were not asked (including the dependent variable of opinion of the United States). Thus, there are now about 32,000 respondents from forty countries.

To measure the dependent variable, *Anti-American sentiments*, this paper will use the following question from the survey: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States" (*What the World Thinks in 2002*). Respondents then answer 1 for "Very favorable", 2 for "Somewhat favorable," 3 for "Somewhat unfavorable," and 4 for "Very unfavorable." While this ordinal measure works well for many of the various analytical tools, it will sometimes be necessary to collapse the responses into a simpler form, i.e. 1 and 2 for Very and Somewhat favorable will be collapsed into "Positive," and 3 and 4 for Somewhat and Very unfavorable will be collapsed into "Negative."

My indicator of *nationalism* comes from the survey question: Do "you completely agree [1], mostly agree [2], mostly disagree [3] or completely disagree [4] with [the following statement?] Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others" (*What the World Thinks in 2002*). If necessary, this variable will also be collapsed in a similar fashion to opinion of the United States so that two categories, Nationalist and Non-Nationalist, emerge.

My indicator of *government legitimacy*, or respondent's confidence in their national government comes from the survey question: "What kind of influence [is the national government] having on the way things are going in (survey country). Is the influence of the national government very good [1], somewhat good [2], somewhat bad [3] or very bad [4] in (survey country)" (*What the World Thinks in 2002*). By examining this we will hopefully see the effect that legitimacy has on one's opinion of the United States.

The measure of *democratic values* will be based on Freedom House scores from 2002 (the year of the survey). Freedom House scores countries on a system going from 1 to 7, with 1 being the most free and 7 being not free. In the middle, countries can be ranked as partly free. By using this particular measure of democracy (and in the process transferring this country level variable to the individual level) we will achieve an understanding of how a country's overall level of democracy affects an individual's anti- American sentiments.

*Economic deprivation* will be measured with the following question: "Have there been times during the last year when you did not have enough money to buy food your family needed? [...] 1 Yes 2 No." This question is very good in that it cuts to heart of the issue quickly. Other questions about income asked whether respondents were satisfied with it, but this question was the best in terms of capturing the level of deprivation that might actually cause anti-Americanism.

I also created an original variable, *U.S. military intervention*. To create this dummy variable, I coded each respondent from a country that had experienced U.S. military intervention in his/her country anytime between 1964 and 2007. I created this dummy variable using a timeline of U.S. military intervention (<http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/history/interventions.htm>). By using the year 1964, I was able to include a few more countries into the

variable that had experienced U.S. intervention. For respondents who were not alive in 1964, this may seem to pose a problem, but it seems clear that one would not need to have direct contact with an outside military force to feel its effects, even after the intervention was over. Thus, we will hopefully be able to see the effect U.S. military intervention has on one's opinion of the United States.

To improve the measure of how the U.S. military affects opinion, we will include a couple of other indicators. These indicators come from the scale created by Tai et al. The first, coded in the same way as military intervention, looks at whether a respondent's country hosts a *United States military base*. The data comes from the Peace Pledge Union, a group that created a map showing U.S. military bases around the world from 2001-2003 (Peace Pledge Union). The other variable, *U.S. military aid*, measures how much money the United States has given to a country to aid its military. The amounts are in U.S. dollars and are coded based on country in the same way as the previously mentioned country level variables (USAID data). The data are a total of the amount of money given between 1964 and 2002.

In addition to economic deprivation, this country will also look at the level of economic influence the United States has in a country. (These variables also come from Tai et al.) This will be measured by the amount of U.S. direct investment, the level of proportional trade, and the total economic assistance. *U.S. direct investment* measures how much money the United States has invested in foreign countries' means of productions such as factories. The data for this came from U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs and is quite simply coded in the same country-level fashion, with a unit of U.S. dollars. The next indicator, *proportional trade*, is slightly more complex. This variable was created by adding up a country's total imports to and exports from the United States, and dividing that number by the total amount of exports and imports. By doing so, a ratio is created in which the higher a number is, the more the United States dominates trade with a particular country, and thus is an excellent indicator of economic influence. The data for this variable use a combination of CIA World Fact Book 2002 figures and Trade State Express, a program from the U.S. Department of Commerce. The last indicator, *total economic assistance*, measures how much total money the United States has given to a particular country for economic assistance. It uses the U.S. dollars unit and is coded in the same way as the other country-level variables. This variable comes from the USAID and is a total of the amount of money given between 1964 and 2002.

The final variable measuring a type of U.S. influence is *tourism*. This variable was created by looking at the number of U.S. citizens who spent at least a night in a foreign country, and then dividing this number by the country's population to control for size. The greater the number, the greater the relative U.S. tourist presence is in a given country. Data for this variable came from the United States Office of Travel and Tourism Industries.

As far as demographics go, the way they are coded in the survey makes their use very difficult. Education, race, and religion are all coded differently for each country in the survey, so it is difficult to make any sort of coherent sense of these variables. Still, some progress was able to be made, but we will only be able to use one proxy measure for religion, which asked respondents to rate how important religion is in their life, and one dummy variable, which sees if respondents are Muslim. (Islam was selected as opposed to other religions because of the historic hostility between predominantly Islamic countries and the United States.) Gender is also usable, and is coded as 1 for male and 2 for female.

**Table 1: Variables and Predicted Direction of Correlation**

Variables		Measure	Predicted Correlation Direction with DV
<b>Dependent Variable:</b>	Opinion of the United States	1 Very Favorable	--
		2 Somewhat Favorable	
		3 Somewhat Unfavorable	
		4 Very Unfavorable	
<b>Independent Variables</b>			
Internal	Nationalism	1 Highly Nationalist	Negative
		2 Somewhat Nationalist	
		3 Somewhat Non-Nationalist	
		4 Completely Non-Nationalist	
	Government Legitimacy	1 Very Legitimate	Positive
		2 Somewhat Legitimate	
		3 Somewhat Not Legitimate	
		4 Completely Not Legitimate	
	Level of Democracy	1.0-2.5 Free	Positive
		3.0-5.5 Partly Free	
		5.5-7.0 Not Free	
	Economic Deprivation	1 Deprived	Negative
2 Not Deprived			
External	U.S. Military Intervention	0 No Intervention	Positive
		1 Intervention	
	U.S. Military Bases	0 No Bases	Positive
		1 Base Present	
	U.S. Military Aid	U.S. Dollars	Negative
	U.S. Direct Investment	U.S. Dollars	Positive
	Proportional Trade	Ratio	Positive
	Total Economic Assistance	U.S. Dollars	Negative
Demographics	Gender	1 Male	Negative
		2 Female	
	Importance of Religion	1 Very Important	Negative
		2 Somewhat Important	
		3 Not Very Important	
Muslim Dummy	0 Non Muslim	Positive	
	1 Muslim		

## Results

Having seen which variables will be examined, we will now begin to see which ones have the greatest influence on one's anti-American sentiments. Before getting into the effects of

the independent variables, however, we will begin by taking a broad look at the dependent variable, anti-Americanism. Overall, the results are surprisingly positive as seen in Table 2:

**Table 2: Opinion of the United States**

	Positive	Negative
<b>Overall</b>	59.3%	31.2%
Africa	78.8%	21.2%
Latin America	70.4%	26.9%
South Central Asia	49.1%	50.9%
East Asia	63.8%	36.2%
South East Asia	74.9%	25.1%
Eastern Europe	73.2%	26.8%
Western Europe	69.5%	30.5%
North America	73.1%	26.9%
Middle East	32.4%	67.6%

Overall, 59.3% of the respondents have a positive opinion of the United States, while only 31.2% have a negative. This may be skewed by the countries that are and are not included (see Appendix A) but it is still an interesting preliminary result. Only in the Middle East and South Central Asia do the majority of respondents have a negative opinion of the United States

Now that we have seen what the dependent variable looks like overall, we will now examine the effect the independent variables have on it. For the initial look at the data, a number of independent variables will be examined in order to try and explain variance in the dependent variable, which is opinion of the United States. The five variables are level of nationalism, whether the United States has had military presence in the country since 1964, legitimacy of the national government, support for democratic values, economic deprivation, and demographics. The initial results show that my independent variables are relatively weak in explaining variance in opinion of the United States. However, statistical significance is at high levels almost universally, which means that we can have a good deal of confidence in the results, even if they are weak. To begin, we will look at bivariate correlation between the DV and several of the IVs. The results of the bivariate tests are summarized below in Table 3, and then discussed.

**Table 3: Bivariate Correlation of Independent and Dependent Variables**

Bivariate Correlation Results			
Variable	Pearson's Correlation Coefficient	Statistical Significance	Expected Direction?
Nationalism	-.022	.000**	Yes
U.S. Military Intervention	.019	.001**	Yes
Government Legitimacy	.161	.000**	Yes
Democratic Values	.129	.000**	Yes
Economic Deprivation	-.044	.000**	Yes
Gender	.066	.000**	No
Importance of Religion	-.125	.000**	Yes
Muslim Dummy Variable	.209	.000**	Yes

\*\*Significant at the .01 level

Bivariate analysis of nationalism and opinion of the U.S. reveals a negative relationship, meaning that as one's level of nationalism increases, one's opinion of the United States decreases. The test produced a Pearson Correlation coefficient of -.022 and a statistical significance of .000. This fits with the pattern mentioned in the introduction, which was that correlation is weak, but statistical significance is high. This correlation seems to make sense intuitively, although it is surprising that the correlation is not higher.

Bivariate analysis of United State military intervention and opinion of the U.S. reveals a positive relationship, which in this case means that if one's country has been subject to U.S. military intervention, one's opinion of the United States is more likely to be negative. (U.S. military intervention was measured by looking at a timeline of U.S. military intervention.) The test produced a Pearson Correlation coefficient of .019 and a statistical significance of .001. Again, correlation is low, but statistical significance is high. This relationship is also in the expected direction, although not as strong as expected. Perhaps a finer measure of U.S. intervention needs to be constructed, rather than simply seeing if the United State military was present or not. The later inclusion of U.S military bases and U.S. military monetary aid will hopefully solve this problem.

Bivariate analysis of one's feeling about the national government's legitimacy and opinion of the U.S. reveals a negative relationship, which in this case means that if one feels that the government of their country is not legitimate, one's opinion of the United States is more likely to be negative. The test produced a Pearson Correlation coefficient of .161 and a statistical significance of .000. Although this is the highest correlation yet, it is still quite weak. Again,

however, statistical significance is high so we can have confidence in the result. The result seems to make sense, though again it is not as strong as expected.

Bivariate correlation between anti-Americanism and level of democracy reveals a positive relationship, meaning that as one's country becomes less free, one is more likely to harbor anti-American sentiments. The Pearson correlation coefficient of .129 is in the expected direction, but is weak. The statistical significance is high, however, so we can be confident in these results. This result makes sense for two reasons: first, countries that are free are more likely to respect the United States for its democratic values. Second, it seems that free countries will also be less likely to need to use the United States as a scapegoat.

The direction of bivariate correlation between economic deprivation and anti-Americanism is negative, with a coefficient of -.044. This means if one is suffering from economic deprivation (measured by whether the respondent has enough money to buy food for his or her family) one is more likely to have anti-American sentiments. This fits with the internal stress idea, but the correlation is not very strong. Statistically, however, the finding is significant at the .01 level, so we can be confident in the limited explanatory power of economic deprivation.

For demographics, this paper will look at the importance of religion, a Muslim dummy variable, and gender. While other demographic variables would be interesting, coding problems prevent this from being feasible, so we will only look at the variables mentioned. Beginning with gender, the Pearson correlation coefficient is .066, meaning that if you are female, you are more likely to dislike the U.S., and thus if you are male, you are more likely to like the U.S.. Intuitively, this does not seem to make sense, and indeed the correlation is very weak. Statistically, the finding is significant at the .01 level.

For the importance of religion, the more important religion is to the respondent, the more likely he or she is to harbor anti-American sentiment. However, the correlation is only -.125 which, although higher than some of the other findings, is not a very strong explainer of anti-Americanism. This finding, although statistically significant (.01 level), may not reveal very much information. Since it does not take into account what religion the respondent is, we are missing a very important piece of the puzzle. The Muslim dummy variable has a positive Pearson correlation coefficient of .209, which is the strongest correlation thus far. It too is statistically significant at the .01 level, suggesting that this is a relationship we can have trust in. The positive coefficients mean that Muslims are more likely to be anti-American, which matches our hypothesis.

Before looking further, we must check for multicollinearity among the independent variables. Bivariate correlation reveals that the strongest relationship between any of the independent variables is between the Muslim dummy variable and Freedom House rankings, suggesting that Muslims often come from remarkably un-free countries. The finding is significant at the .01 level, but both variables will still be included in subsequent analysis. There was also some correlation between the Muslim variable and importance of religion, but again the variables will both be left separate and included. Perhaps one of the most interesting of the correlations is between U.S. military intervention and the importance of religion in one's life, with a coefficient of -.160, meaning that if that the U.S. military was present in the respondents country, religion is more likely to be important for the respondent. (Or vice versa, the more religious one is, the more like the U.S. military is to come to one's country.) There may be some interesting material here in terms of the U.S. military putting the fear of God into foreign

countries, but for the purpose of this paper we will ignore this weak correlation and move without worry into linear regression analysis.

The first model we will look at will employ only three of the independent variables, which will be nationalism, presence of U.S. military, and government legitimacy. The linear regression model had similar overall results to the bivariate correlation, i.e. correlation was weak but statistical significance was generally high.

**Table 4: Linear Regression with Nationalism, U.S. Military Presence, and Government Legitimacy**

Model Summary			
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Standard Error of the Estimate
0.183	0.033	0.033	1.225

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F Statistic	Significance
Regression	1657.380	3	552.460	367.985	.000
Residual	48087.864	32031	1.501		
Total	49745.244	32034			

Coefficients					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t statistic	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	1.936	.021	--	92.579	.000
Government Legitimacy	.175	.006	.151	27.247	.000
Nationalism	.085	.006	.081	14.640	.000
U.S. Military Intervention	-.090	.017	-.030	-5.416	.000

Overall, the model, which had opinion of the U.S. as the DV and the three discussed variables as the IVs, had an adjusted R square of .033, which is not very high, but a statistical significance of .000. Standardized beta coefficients revealed that government legitimacy is the strongest predictor, with a value of .151. Overall, the model did not perform very well.

In this next model, we will look at the same variables as before, but add level of democracy, economic deprivation, gender, U.S. Military bases, amount of military aid, U.S. direct investment, proportional trade, total economic assistance, tourism, a Muslim dummy

variable, the importance of religion, and control for region. Adding these variables greatly improves the model, but it is still relatively weak, as we can see from Table 5.

**Table 5: Linear Regression with Nationalism, U.S. Military Presence, Government Legitimacy, Level of Democracy, Economic Deprivation, Gender, Importance of Religion, Tourism, Additional Economic Measures, Additional Military Measures, and Regional Control**

Model Summary			
R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Standard Error of the Estimate
.403	.163	.161	1.118

ANOVA					
	Sum of Squares	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F Statistic	Significance
Regression	3296.397	22	149.836	119.933	.000
Residual	16973.065	13586	1.249		
Total	20269.462	13608			

Coefficients					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t statistic	Significance
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
Constant	3.200	.257	--	12.448	.000
Government Legitimacy	.172	.010	.150	17.272	.000
Nationalism	.135	.009	.132	15.637	.000
Level of Democracy	-.289	.092	-.266	-3.143	.002
U.S. Military Intervention	-.950	.437	-.257	-2.177	.030
U.S. Military Bases	-1.394	.318	-.557	-4.388	.000
Military Aid	-6.36E-005	.000	-.395	-4.593	.000
Economic Deprivation	-.183	.021	-.075	-8.840	.000
U.S. Direct Investment	-1.42E-006	.000	-.089	-3.564	.000
Proportional Trade	-3.004	.308	-1.270	-9.754	.000
Total Economic Assistance	.000	.000	1.833	4.585	.000
Tourism	10935.338	19289.062	.884	5.672	.000
Importance of Religion	.044	.011	.038	3.878	.000
Muslim	.585	.073	.137	8.055	.000
Gender	.142	.019	.058	7.327	.000
Africa	-1.406	.187	-.189	-5.588	.000
East Asia	.624	.149	.139	4.190	.000
South Central Asia	-6.374	1.473	-1.919	-4.328	.000
South East Asia	.615	.409	.111	1.503	.133
Eastern Europe	-1.390	.129	-.401	-10.774	.000
Western Europe	.140	.251	.034	.560	.576
Middle East	1.474	.413	.316	3.571	.000
North America	2.955	.388	.455	7.618	.000

The addition of these variables greatly improves the model, but it is still not very strong. The adjusted R squared increased to .161 and the model as a whole retained its significance at the .01 level. There are also changes in the standardized beta coefficients. Most notably, controlling for region caused the importance of nationalism to increase from a beta of .081 to .132 and for U.S. Military intervention to go from -.030 to -.257. While neither of these coefficients are extremely high, the change in the coefficient warrants attention. From these

changes, we can see that when region is controlled for, nationalism becomes much more important in determining one's level of anti-Americanism. The same can be said for whether the United States military has intervened in one's country or not, but it should be noted that controlling for region makes the statistical significance of this variable decrease to .030. Thus, it is difficult to say what affect, if any, military intervention has on a country's opinion of the United States.

In terms of the new variables, some interesting insights can be gained. The two strongest explanatory variables of all are both economic ones. The first, proportional trade, has a standardized beta coefficient of -1.270. This means that the more the United States dominates a country's trade, the better opinion its people will have of the United States. This result seems somewhat counterintuitive, if one takes it to mean that economic domination helps decrease anti-Americanism, but this may be a causal relationship direction problem. Since correlation does not always mean causation, we may be seeing that the United States tends to trade with countries that have a positive opinion of it.

The second powerful economic variable is total economic assistance. This standardized beta coefficient of 1.833 suggests that the more economic assistance the U.S. gives the worse opinion its people will have of the United States. Again, this seems counterintuitive, but it may be a phenomenon of reversed cause and effect. Perhaps we tend to give aid to countries that do not like the U.S. in order to improve their opinion of the U.S. It is also possible that increased aid gives respondents a feeling of helplessness, dependence and resentment that causes them to dislike the United States.

Surprisingly, increased U.S. direct investment does little to affect opinion of the United States, at least in comparison to some of the factors. With a standardized beta of only -.089, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. This variable may be weak due to a lack of knowledge about America's activity in this area, or due to more pressing needs that respondents worry about. In either case, it seems that U.S. direct investment in other countries is not a source of anti-Americanism.

In terms of military influence, we have already seen the effect controlling for region had on U.S. military intervention. In an attempt to refine this measure, however, the variables U.S. military bases and military aid were added. These variables performed quite strongly, with a standardized beta of -.557 for military bases and -.395 for military aid. These negative coefficients suggest that if the U.S. has a military base in a country, its people are more likely to be pro-America, and that the more military aid the U.S. gives to a country, the more it will like the U.S. While the military aid result makes sense, the positive effect of a military base is somewhat odd. This may be due to reversed cause and effect, or it may also be due to the potential boost that could come to a country's economy by having an American military base on its soil.

Another measure of influence that was not included in the first model is tourism. In the second model, tourism had a standardized beta of .884. This positive correlation suggests that increased tourism of U.S. citizens to foreign countries causes the host country to have a worse opinion of the United States. Once again, however, this result may be skewed given the likelihood that U.S. citizens prefer to go to countries that receive Americans kindly. Also, countries in which United States did not cross a certain threshold in terms of amount of tourists were not included. This could result in certain undesirable countries not being included, and it is likely that these countries would have a negative opinion of the United States. Thus, it is

difficult to draw any definite conclusions from the relatively high explanatory power of the tourism variable.

Another important new variable in the second model is level of democracy. It received a standardized beta of  $-.266$  and a significance of  $.002$ . This suggests that the freer a country is, the more likely it is to have a negative opinion of the United States. This is a very strange result and does not match the expectations from the literature or the results of the bivariate correlation test. The reason this occurred is difficult to determine, but it is most likely due to the fact that region was controlled for. Perhaps when region is controlled for, its strong effect wipes out other variables explanatory power.

And finally, although the regional dummy variables were used more for control, they deserve some examination. A look at the standardized betas reveals that South Central Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North America are the regions with the strongest opinions and most effect on one's opinion of the United States. South Central Asia and Eastern Europe have negative standardized betas of  $-1.919$  and  $-.401$ , respectively, meaning that people from these regions are more likely to be pro-American when all other variables are controlled for. This is surprising for South Central Asia given its overall approval rate of  $49.1\%$  that we saw earlier. Perhaps even more surprising is that the other regions mentioned (the Middle East and North America) are more likely to be pro-American. This makes sense in North America (which in this study only includes Canada) but is completely counterintuitive for the Middle East. The initial look at the DV showed that the Middle East had the lowest approval rate of all, so it is difficult to ascertain why this result occurred. Perhaps it is due to the controlling done by the Muslim dummy variable and the democracy levels, but one cannot be sure.

## Conclusion

Because of the relative weakness of both models, it is difficult to make any definite conclusions about anti-Americanism, but there are some things we can know. Instead of randomly compiling results into plausible conclusions, however, we will look at the results systematically, following the guidelines of internal versus external sources of anti-Americanism. In these conclusions, suggestions about U.S. foreign policy will be made, but it should be noted that they are relatively simplistic and rely on causal relationships that might not be as sound and on results that were relatively weak throughout, despite their nearly universal statistical significance.

In terms of external sources of anti-Americanism, one of the most surprising results of the paper is the weakness of the U.S. military intervention. This could be due to the measure not being precise enough, or to problems in terms of a lack of cases that exhibited this phenomenon. Whatever the reason, U.S. military intervention performed poorly in bivariate tests, the first model, and the second model. Although statistically significant, its correlation and beta coefficients were consistently low. Attempts to refine this measure were made by including whether a country had a U.S. military base on its soil and how much money the U.S. had given to the country for military aid. These variables performed strongly and were effective in terms of improving opinion of the United States. Perhaps we can conclude from this that positive intervention by the United States is more easily remembered and long lasting than any negative intervention, but this seems hard to believe given history's seemingly long memory for hardship caused by outsiders.

In addition to military influence, economic influence proved to be an important external factor in determining one's level of anti-Americanism. Interestingly, one's personal level of

economic deprivation did not perform well in the models, but this may be due to individuals' tendency to blame themselves for economic hardship before they blame the government. As mentioned, the macro and external measures were surprisingly strong indicators. Although U.S. direct investment was not that important, the proportional trade and total economic assistance variables were quite strong, though not in the expected way. The results showed that increased domination of a country's trade by the U.S. reduced anti-Americanism, and that more total economic assistance decreased opinion of the United States. Neither of these results are intuitive, but if they are accurate they suggest that changes in the U.S.'s foreign policy must be made. While it is obviously not U.S. policy to try and get everyone to like the U.S., it seems pointless to waste so much money on foreign aid, according to this data. It would make sense to get more involved directly through trade, and perhaps channel more money into military aid (assuming these correlations do have the correct causal direction).

Having the relative strength and surprising results of the external variables, we will now look at the internal variables. The only consistent indicator throughout was government legitimacy. It performed relatively well in all three tests, and while it did not have any major increases, it remained constant when more and more control variables were added to the model. This suggests that government legitimacy should be a prime focus of our foreign policy, if the U.S. is interested in improving its reputation. Doing so will decrease discontent, which would be good on all levels.

Level of democracy did not perform exceptionally well. Its results were mixed, suggesting that it is neither a great help nor hurt to our reputation around the world. Thus, it seems to not make sense to try and spread democracy at such a furious rate, unless it can be shown that U.S. interests are purely ideological. If that is the case, then spreading democracy could possibly be a good humanitarian gesture, but it will have little effect on the United States' reputation abroad.

Finally, the demographic Muslim dummy variable performed relatively well. In the bivariate tests it was the strongest indicator of anti-Americanism, and in the second linear regression model it performed decently in comparison to the rest. If one combines this information with the original dependent variable results that only in South Central Asia and the Middle East did the majority of respondents dislike America, as well as the relative strength of these variables in the second model as control variables, it seems clear that the United States needs to reach out to all parts of the Islamic world. Our current policies are breeding hatred or at least doing nothing to assuage it.

In the end, the results are slightly dissatisfying. Correlations could have been higher, and some of the variables did not perform as well as hoped. If the conclusions drawn are accurate, they suggest that some fundamental changes need to take place. Currently, the United States is supposedly promoting democracy and setting up legitimate government in Iraq, but our efforts seem to only decrease world opinion of America. While there are Iraqis who are glad to be rid of Saddam and his oppressive regime, there are few who are really benefiting from the current violence taking place. In this case, our finding about United States military presence increasing anti-Americanism makes sense, but it seems like it should be stronger.

From all this, it seems clear that anti-Americanism can not be caused by purely internal or external factors. External economic and military factors are important, but no matter how good these indicators are they cannot overcome a government that does not enjoy any legitimacy. Thus, our structural, cultural, and institutional approach has provided a decent model that provides an excellent start to understanding anti-Americanism.

What, then, is missing from the model, or what should be refined? First and foremost, demographic variables need to be more carefully examined. While the importance of religion and the Muslim dummy variable performed decently, they did not do much to provide a picture of the typical “anti-American,” if such a thing exists. Better information about religion could possibly assess what damage is being caused by our Judeo-Christian based alliance with Israel. Demographic information about income would also be good. While the economic deprivation variable was a pretty good proxy, I suspect there were problems with respondents not truthfully reporting about whether they had enough money for food or not.. Also, information about race, ethnicity, minority status, age, and education would have been very useful.

In terms of the more substantive independent variables, the military intervention variable could provide fertile ground for further research. Looking at the nature of the conflicts more in-depth could improve its explanatory power. Also, some more detailed information about the United States history with each country could prove important.

While it is not within the scope of the survey used or this paper to answer the recently posed questions, they do need an answer, so hopefully future research can address these issues. With these possible improvements, a better, more powerful model could potentially developed that would provide more definite clues as to what changes need to be made in American foreign policy. The United States cannot and should not try to please all foreign nations, but an improvement of its image abroad is definitely in order.

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### Appendix A

Region	Country	U.S. Military Intervention
Africa	Angola	1
	Ivory Coast	0
	Ghana	1
	Kenya	0
	Mali	0
	Nigeria	0
	Senegal	0
	South Africa	0
	Tanzania	0
	Uganda	0
	Latin America	Argentina
Bolivia		1
Brazil		1
Guatemala		1
Honduras		1
Mexico		0
Peru		0
Venezuela		0
South Central Asia		Uzbekistan
	Bangladesh	0
	India	0
	Pakistan	0
East Asia	Japan	0
	South Korea	0
South East Asia	Indonesia	1
	Philippines	1
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria	0
	Czech Republic	0
	Poland	0
	Russia	0
	Slovak Republic	0
	Ukraine	0
Western Europe	France	0
	Germany	0
	Italy	0
	Great Britain	0
North America	Canada	0
Middle East	Jordan	0
	Lebanon	1
	Turkey	0
		1=Yes, 0= No