

Jake Posey and Justin Taylor
Do National Parties Still Matter?
A Study of Party System Congruence in the South

Party systems, partisan demographic bases of support, have been understood to be national in orientation and salient through both state and national elections. Those demographic bases of support provide the foundation for the alignment of each party. There is an emerging controversy concerning the nature of the contemporary American party system. The debate is over the degree to which state parties can break away from the national system and look for different bases of support within the state, in effect becoming autonomous from the national party system. Autonomous state party systems are those where the local party coalitions are consistently different from the national party coalitions. James Gimpel, in his 1996 work *National Elections and the Autonomy of American State Party Systems*, puts forth the argument that the United States is witnessing a paradigm shift away from conventional alignment theory. In its place, a bifurcated system of incongruence between national and state party systems is emerging which may be the forerunner of total dealignment.

American parties could be fundamentally altered if Gimpel's claim of an emerging incongruence is correct. Sustained autonomous state party systems would contribute to the rise of candidate-centered elections. Voters could claim membership in two different parties, one at the state level and one at the national level. The American party system, already relatively weak compared to other industrialized democracies, could collapse altogether. Party behavior, organization, and discipline would be drastically altered and reduced. The very relevance of national parties could be called into question. This work attempts to measure electoral incongruence in the South to determine if the conditions for autonomous state parties are developing.

V.O. Key's 1949 seminal work on Southern politics provides an understanding of the geopolitical history of the South. He shows that the South's unique geopolitical history led to the development of a one party system with very little party discipline. His competition-cohesion thesis directly applies to the South of the first sixty years of the twentieth century. The region was so completely dominated at all levels by the Democratic Party that there was no survival instinct to keep the elite, let alone voters, in line with the national party.

As Black and Black observed, the South now controls 27 percent of the nation's electoral votes and holds some of the earliest and most influential primaries. The South is absolutely crucial for any presidential candidate who hopes to secure the nomination. "The modern South is the largest, the most cohesive, and, arguably, the most important region in the United States in terms of establishing the partisan direction' ' (Black and Black 344).
The modern

South, with its unique geopolitical history and traditionally weak party systems, should provide a breeding ground for the kinds of incongruences Gimpel suggests are becoming widespread and increasingly stable.

Gimpel studied traditional old-line party states of the North and contrasted them with the weak party states of the West. Using regression models, Gimpel attempted to measure party strength and therefore the degree of national party hegemony. After analyzing those results and anecdotal evidence, he developed three possible types of incongruence. The first, *issue incongruence*, is characterized by a salient issue within a state cross-cutting the national cleavages. When the cleavages within a state are the national cleavages but the proportion of partisans is drastically different, *partisan incongruence* has developed. Gimpel's third and fundamentally most challenging to the current understanding of party systems is *issue-partisan incongruence*. This is a combination of the first two; a crosscutting, salient issue has re-proportioned partisans at a different balance than the national system within the state. Under these circumstances, Gimpel argues sustained and systematic divergence from the national party system will allow autonomous state systems to develop. Gimpel concludes that the western states in particular produce electoral divisions in state level contests which "rarely match those at the national level" (Gimpel 18). While he finds this phenomenon to be most apparent in the West, Gimpel concludes that it has "become a model for understanding changes coming to the rest of the nation" (Gimpel 18).

Gimpel equates the weak party systems of the West with those of the South. Although originating out of very different circumstances, the comparison for the issue at hand seems reasonable. Ample evidence from the southern state electoral literature demonstrates that presidential contests were, for many decades, fought on a different electoral plane than those at the sub-presidential level (e.g., Scher, 1997; Glaser, 1997; Black and Black, 1992; Lamis, 1984; Bartley and Graham, 1975; Key, 1949). This phenomenon was understood to be part of the ongoing process of realignment. In his 1983 work, James Sundquist analyzed the New Deal realignment and discovered evidence for what he termed "two-stage realignment." Sundquist described the process by which Democrats broke through in many northern states at the presidential level and became competitive in state-level contests after only a generation. This has obvious implications for the South. This region, which experienced realignment at the presidential level toward Republicanism thirty years ago, has only now experienced a shift toward Republican dominance at the state level. Coupled with this knowledge about the increasing electoral importance of the South, it is imperative this region be included in any understanding of Gimpel's intrastate party system autonomy theory.

A recent study by Tari Renner (1998) failed to confirm two hypotheses implied by Gimpel's work. His study used a factor analysis of county level Democratic two-party vote percentages for all presidential, senatorial and

gubernatorial elections from 1986 to 1996 in the same northern and western states used by Gimpel. It demonstrated that a single dominant factor emerged which explained between 74 and 92 percent of the variance in state geographic electoral cleavages. There were no major distinctive state level factors that emerged. In addition, there were few differences between the so-called "old line" party organization states of the North and the West. Renner concludes, "there do not appear to be consistently different electoral planes along which state elections are fought. While there may be more short-term, presumably candidate-centered fluctuations in some statewide elections, the contests at both the presidential and state level appear to be variations of the same party systems" (Renner 11).

The question to be answered is not whether incongruence exists, but whether this phenomenon is expanding and becoming the norm rather than the exception. Gimpel implies the end of the "totality of realignments" (Gimpel 10). Electoral incongruence has been documented throughout United States history in every region of the country. However, this incongruence has been part of a process of change and realignment. It was understood that major realignments such as the New Deal coalition would play out differently in each state. Over time, all states would move toward the national alignment (Renner 5). This is a critical difference from the state-level party system autonomy implied by Gimpel.

An important geographic limitation of both Gimpel's work and Renner's response is that they are confined to an analysis of non-southern states. Gimpel discusses the historical tendency of both the South and the West to have weak party organizations. In the former region, however, the weaknesses are attributable to the virtual absence of effective competition between the major parties. As discussed previously, the dramatic shift toward two-party competition in the South not only provides an opportunity to measure Gimpel's implications but also to re-examine Key's competition-cohesion thesis. The transformation of the South's partisan climate over the last thirty years should provide us with an excellent opportunity to examine longitudinal and cross-sectional patterns. Considering Key's thesis and recent work on partisan and ideological trends, we might actually expect a trend toward greater electoral congruence in the South.

Hypotheses and Measurement

The research presented here attempts to examine the evidence of incongruence implied by Gimpel's intrastate party system autonomy theory. Through an examination of geographic voting patterns, trends toward greater congruence (less autonomy) should become apparent. The hypotheses implied are as follows:

H1: Over time, statewide elections in the South will produce electoral cleavages, which are increasingly congruent with presidential electoral cleavages within each state.

H2: Rim South electoral cleavage congruence will appear earlier in time than electoral cleavage congruence in the Deep South.

H3: Statewide electoral cleavages in the Rim South will produce consistently higher congruence with presidential races than those of the Deep South.

County-level voting returns have been used to measure the incongruence of intrastate party systems. Renner, Gimpel and others (Bartley and Graham, 1975; Seagull, 1975; Lamis, 1984; Blair, 1986) have used county-level partisan voting results as a measure of geographical cleavages between the parties. Taken as a whole, these county-level results will measure the continuity of the parties' demographic strengths over time while controlling for particularly weak candidates and across election cycles. The data collected included all presidential and gubernatorial elections in the South from 1972 to 1996. The reasons for choosing this time period were two-fold. First, we wanted to be able to compare our findings to those of Renner and Gimpel. Gimpel was not uniform in the periods he used to examine each state. Renner used 1985-1996. We included the earlier time period in the interests of a more expansive longitudinal study. Also, Black and Black identified 1972 as a watershed year for Southern electoral politics (post-Wallace and Voting Rights Act). Thus, we chose 1972-1996 in order to compare Renner and Gimpel and to draw longitudinal conclusions that point towards trends for the future.

Gubernatorial elections were used to measure the state party system. Presidential races were used as a measure of the national party systems geographic patterns. Gimpel and Renner's use of senatorial elections in their study was problematic due to the debate over the use of senatorial elections as national or state-level measures. Erickson, Wright, and McIver (1993) found senatorial elections to be a hybrid of state and national parties. They also found that the short and long-term electoral forces of senatorial elections are more similar to gubernatorial than to presidential elections. Due to this, they concluded that senatorial elections should be treated as state-level elections. Other research shows that there are different electoral forces behind the two types of elections (Simon, Ostrom and Marra, 1991; Atkeson and Partin, 1995; and Holbrook-Provow, 1987). Atkeson and Partin find that, "As members of the national legislative branch, senators' fortunes are linked to the successes or failures of the president. In contrast, governors are held accountable for perceived state economic conditions, while senators escape unscathed from the same general economic evaluations" (Atkeson and Partin 99). On account of this conflict, we eliminated senatorial races from our design.

Data was compiled from the America Votes series of county-level voting returns. The adjusted two-party percentages were used to calculate the

correlation coefficients. In order to present the data in a more digestible format, we then calculated the median coefficient for the president-governor relationship in each of the time periods. These results can be found in Tables I and 2. Use of medians will also allow for a more useful discussion of overall longitudinal and cross-sectional trends. This should facilitate a closer and more applicable comparison on a state by state level. In several cases, inconclusive evidence called for a more refined methodological approach.

Renner used factor analysis to examine the findings of Gimpel's work. By taking this approach, he was able to determine that past elections of senator, governor, and president could explain high amounts of variance, but he was unable to differentiate between each race. This was because a factor analysis groups similar variables together into a single variable. Gimpel drew many of his conclusions from the variables mentioned above. This method limited his research because he was testing indirect measures of party. Our second method will allow us to directly measure party congruence through an autoregression analysis testing each individual race. The model that will be tested is as follows: $Y = b_0 + b_1 x_1 + b_2 x_2 + e_1$

Where Y is the gubernatorial election, x_1 is the previous gubernatorial elections, x_2 is the presidential election held in the same year or the previous election cycle, and e_1 is the error term.

To further analyze the inconsistencies in our initial findings, we have used this method to examine particular state and national elections. In this equation, if we consistently see higher beta weight coefficients for gubernatorial races, then the gubernatorial race is the driving force behind the r-square coefficient. But, if instead we find consistently higher beta weights for the presidential race variable, then we can conclude that the presidential race is driving the r-square. If the latter is true, this points to a high level of congruence between national and state-level party systems.

Findings

After only a cursory examination of Tables I and 2, some general trends become apparent. Medians in all eleven states present evidence of consistently moderate to high relationship strengths in geographic voting patterns. We see a stabilized and systematic congruence over time and throughout both sub-regions. **Nine out of the** eleven states displayed a strengthening of the relationship between national and state-level voting patterns. By the second time period, we see all eleven states with highly congruent electoral systems. Using the autoregression method, these general findings become even more evident. The r-square values for all the states ranged from .218 to .938. Over time we see a greater tendency toward congruence in the state and national elections. Throughout the 1970s the data shows lower r-square values for each race. The 1974 Arkansas race was the least congruent of all the races while

most other r-square values ranged from .3 to .5. In most cases, the data showed that presidential elections were better determinants of gubernatorial elections than the previous gubernatorial race. This points toward national system dominance of the state party systems. When our second model compared the Deep and Rim South, we found the Rim South to display higher levels of congruence than the Deep South during the earlier time periods. The Deep South demonstrated similar levels of congruence between national and statelevel systems by the 1990s. A general discussion of both sub-regions will provide the background needed to examine the data as it relates to the three hypotheses.

In the Rim South (Table 1), the median correlations range from .448 to .834 for the first time period. The majority of median relationship strengths are .6's or .7's. The Rim South presents evidence of high congruence from state to national. In the second time period (1985-1996), the trend continues for the Rim South, in fact generally we see slight to moderate increases in the median relationship measures. The medians range from .743 to .910, while predominately we see medians in the .7's and .8's.

Table 1
Rim South
Correlation Coefficient Medians

1972 - 1984	1985 - 1996	
Arkansas	.614	.743
Florida	.448	.749
North Carolina	.708	.910
Tennessee	.834	.756
Texas	.694	.860
Virginia~	.779	.747

The Deep South (Table 2) presents a slightly different story. During the first time period the medians ranged from .398 to .638. The majority of medians were in the 'A's and .5's suggesting a moderate congruence between all levels. Moving to the 1985-1996 period we see a pronounced shift in medians. They range from .636 to .902. The Deep South in every state measured marked increases in correlation coefficients.

The pronounced trend in both regions is of a consistent and in most cases increasing congruence, pointing to greater national party influence and conversely less autonomy. The Rim South's extremely high medians maintaining their levels and in fact slightly increasing demonstrates the systematic stability of the national party system. The Deep South's dramatic increase provides

Table 2
Deep South
Correlation Coefficient Medians

	1972-1984	1985-1996
Alabama	.398	.902
Georgia	.428	.636
Louisiana	.571	.641
Mississippi	.564	.746
South Carolina	.638	.880

additional evidence of the trend toward greater congruence, less autonomy. We will now turn to our hypotheses and examine the data's implications for each.

HE Over time, statewide elections in the South will produce electoral cleavages which are increasingly congruent with presidential electoral cleavages within each state.

Out of the eleven states studied, nine supported this hypothesis. Two exceptions are found: Tennessee and Virginia. Using the autoregression method, we can analyze this inconsistency. The r-square values in Tennessee start off at .639 in 1978 (see Table 6). This is a high level of congruence during this decade. In the next election, when Lamar Alexander (R) ran for reelection, we see the coefficient of determination spike to .807 and then drop down to .418 in 1990. The coefficient of determination rebounds to .796 in 1994. The drop in r-square values came when Ned McWherter ran for his first and second terms in 1986 and 1990. The fact that he was preceded and succeeded by a Republican could account for why his coefficients of determination dropped so dramatically. However, the beta weights show that these are the only two elections where the previous gubernatorial election was a better predictor than the presidential election in the equation. The shift in r-square values could possibly be explained by the large swing in voters. Alexander won his 1978 and 1992 elections by 10 and 20 percent respectively and McWherter won his 1986 and 1990 elections by 10 and 25 percent respectively. This shift in votes could have caused a large enough geographic shift to affect the r-square values. But, the fact remains that for the other three elections the presidential election had a stronger impact than the previous gubernatorial election in the races.

Virginia's results exhibit a congruent electoral system that started strong but slightly weakened over time (See Table 8). The r-square value for the 1977 race is .848 and drops during the next two election cycles to .760 and .769. This continues in 1989 and 1993 when the r-square value falls to .463 and then

rebounds to .602. The reason for this decreasing trend is simple. Virginia does not allow governors to hold more than one term of office and this makes it harder for a state party to build a geographic base. This is somewhat more evident when we look at the beta weights for each equation. In four of the five equations, the presidential race had a greater impact on the race than the previous gubernatorial race. The only race when the opposite was true was in 1985 when Gerald Baliles (D) won over Wyatt Durrette (R). Baliles and his predecessor Charles Robb (D) had similar vote margins indicating that they drew their support from similar geographic regions.

The inconsistent results displayed by Virginia and Tennessee are idiosyncratic to specific elections and do not refute the trends in those states or the region as a whole. The rest of the region supported hypothesis and displays a pronounced trend toward an increasing congruence. Looking back at Table 1, we see some of the more dramatic increases in correlation coefficients that include Florida .448 to .749, Alabama .398 to .902, and Mississippi .564 to .746. The trend is undeniable; congruence between state and national elections has increased steadily and in some instances dramatically over the last twentyfour years.

H2: Rim South electoral cleavage congruence will appear earlier in time than electoral cleavage congruence in the Deep South.

By contrasting Tables I and 2, we see strong support for this hypothesis. In the first time period a pronounced gap between the Rim South medians (predominately .6's and .7's) and the Deep South (predominately .5's) emerges. This provides evidence of an earlier move by the Rim South's state systems into congruence with the national party system. The reason for this finding is due to the lack of Republican competition at the state level in the Deep South. For example, in Georgia the Republicans were not able to field a candidate for Governor until 1962. Because of the Republican Party's adolescence in Georgia, the virtual one party system did not allow comparison with the national level party system. In an analysis of Table 10, we see Georgia's party system was incongruent at the national level in the early part of our study. Looking at the beta weights in addition, we see that the previous gubernatorial race became the stronger variable in the 1978 equation. This changes in the 1982 and subsequent equations when we see the presidential beta weight becoming stronger. This evidence demonstrates the Deep South's late shift toward congruence as opposed to the Rim South's earlier shift.

H3: Statewide electoral cleavages in the Rim South will produce consistently higher congruence with presidential races than those of the Deep South.

In an examination of the first time period, we see strong support for the hypothesis. The Rim South's medians are consistently higher than those of

the Deep South. The Deep South medians dip as low as .398 and never top .640. In contrast, the Rim South medians range from .448 to a high of .834. However, by the second time period the gap between Rim and Deep medians virtually vanishes. Deep South medians increased dramatically to range from .636 to .902. Rim South medians only increased slightly ranging from .743 to .910. While the first time period supports the hypothesis, the second period's statistics no longer conform to the hypothesis's expected results.

The high level of congruence in the Rim South is mostly likely due to a pre-existing Republican base, that facilitated state level Republican gains, and therefore demographic and ideological congruence with the national system. Examples of this regional support are western North Carolina, eastern Tennessee, and the Ozarks of Arkansas, all historically non-slave holding areas and thus less hostile to the Republican Party. In these areas, conservative voters did not hesitate to switch to the Republican Party, as did the traditionally conservative Southern Democrats of the Deep South. Once Republicans began to make inroads in the Deep South as well, the congruence between state and national geographic patterns of support quickly caught up with the Rim South.

Conclusion

This research points to a definite trend toward increasing and stabilized congruence between electoral cleavages of national and state parties within a state. There are several implications for previous research. This study's findings are consistent with Key's competition-cohesion thesis. As the Republican Party became competitive in the South, both parties at the state level were influenced and more closely controlled by the national organizations. This had the effect of forcing the state parties to align themselves with the national parties and thus attracting the same demographic groups. Our findings also support Sundquist's two-stage realignment theory. The presidential Republicanism that realigned the South's national politics did not take effect at the state level until much later. But, the incongruence experienced was only temporary and part of the ongoing process of trickle-down alignment. This is inconsistent with Gimpel's long term implications. In fact, the trend in the South is in the opposite direction, an increasingly congruent and stable party system originating from the national party. These conclusions are consistent with Renner's findings on the North and West. A single dominant electoral plane has emerged in the South.

Tables 3 through 13 suggest that idiosyncratic fluid elections are occurring with perhaps more frequency. However, these are only momentary blips caused by particular candidates or issues that briefly shift state-level fault lines. For true state party system autonomy to develop, state organizations would require consistent, long term, and systematic incongruence. The type of incongruence created by these isolated elections cannot provide the environment needed for

autonomy. In fact, in the context of these candidate and/or issue-centered elections, the trends discovered in this study are even more compelling.

Looking at the cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence presented in this study, we can identify broad trends. There has been a strengthening of the party system and increased party cohesion, played out in the geographic patterns of support. Contrasting the Deep to the Rim South, we see several trends over time. There has been a high level of congruence, first experienced in the Rim and later in the Deep. These levels have stabilized and are systematic throughout both regions. The Deep South's dramatic increase in median scores shows the trend toward increasing congruence. The Rim South's maintained and even slightly increased levels of congruence demonstrate the long-term ability to solidify national party system congruence with the state level. While short-term fluctuations may be more frequent in this modern party system, this research clearly demonstrates that these types of incongruences are not engendering systematic state party autonomy from the national party. The trend is in the opposite direction. Greater congruence points to a strengthening of the party system and an even clearer dominance of the national party system at the state level.

Appendix

Table 3
Arkansas
R Squared Value! for Governor and President

Dependent		Independent		
Variable	R Squared	Variables	Beta	Weights Significance
74 - Governor	.218	72 Governor	.241	.09
I - David Pryor		72 President	.366	.02
76 Governor	.805	74 Governor	.410	.00
D - David Pryor		76 President	.625	.00
78 Governor	.340	76 Governor	.247	.03
D - Bill Clinton		76 President	.363	.15
80 Governor	.562	78 Governor	.355	.00
R - Frank White*		80 President	.448	.00
82 Governor	.646	80 Governor	.202	.00
D - Bill Clinton*		80 President	.648	.05
84 Governor	.731	82 Governor	.385	.00
D - Bill Clinton		80 President	.505	.00
86 Governor	.724	84 Governor	.827	.00
D - Bill Clinton"		84 President	.029	.80
90 Governor	.788	86 Governor	.787	.00
D - Bill Clinton		88 President	.133	.09
94 Governor	.723	90 Governor	.431	.00
D - Jim Tucker		92 President	.479	.00

*The current Governor had overcome the incumbent in that year's election. "Clinton's opponent was Frank White.

Table 4
Florida
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables	Beta Weights	Significance
78 Governor	.566	74 Governor	-.099	.26
D - Robert Graham		76 President	.716	.00
82 Governor	.750	78 Governor	.198	.05
D - Robert Graham		80 President	.703	.00
86 Governor	.602	82 Governor	.024	.78
R - Bob Martinez		84 President	.765	.00
90 Governor	.536	86 Governor	.053	.68
D Chiles Lawton*		88 President	.692	.00
94 Governor	.621	90 Governor	.248	.03
D -Chiles Lawton"		92 President		.588 .00

*The current governor had overcome the incumbent in that year's election.

"Opponent was Jeb Bush.

Table 5
North Carolina
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables	Beta Weights	Significance
76 Governor	.831	72 Governor	.558	.00
D - James Hunt		76 President	.404	.00
80 Governor	.558	76 Governor	.A33	.00
D - James Hunt		80 President	.379	.00
84 Governor	.857	80 Governor	.077	.09
R - James Martin		84 President	.881	.00
88 Governor	.938	84 Governor	.375	.00
R - James Martin		88 President	.611	.00
92 Governor	.903	88 Governor	.211	.02
D - James Hunt		92 President	.749	.00
96 Governor	.868	92 Governor	.810	.00
D - James Hunt		92 President	.141	.04

Table 6
Tennessee
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables	Beta Weights	Significance
78 Governor	.639	74 Governor	.038	.84
R - Lamar Alexander		76 President	.764	.00
82 Governor	.807	78 Governor	.354	.00
R - Lamar Alexander		80 President	.597	.00
86 Governor	.578	82 Governor	.407	.01
D - Ned McWherter		84 President	.371	.02
90 Governor	.418	86 Governor	.470	.00
D - Ned McWherter		88 President	.222	.05
94 Governor	.796	90 Governor	.183	.00
R - Don Sundquist		92 President	.772	.00

Table 7
Texas
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	Squared	Independent Variables	Beta Weights	Significance
74 Governor	.655	72 Governor	.741	.01
D - Dolph Briscoe		72 President	.113	.01
78 Governor	.728	74 Governor	-.117	.00
R - William Clements		76 President	.930	.00
82 Governor	.881	78 Governor	.367	.00
R - Mark White*		80 President	.618	.49
86 Governor	.771	82 Governor	.043	.00
R - Mark White"		84 President	.841	.00
90 Governor	.791	86 Governor	.356	.00
D - Ann Richards		88 President	.568	.00
94 Governor	.874	90 Governor	.498	.00
R - George W. Bush*		92 President	.468	.00

*The current governor had overcome the incumbent in that year's election.

"Mark White ran against William Clements.

Table 8
Virginia
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables		
		Beta	Weights	Significance
77 Governor	.848	73 Governor**	.407	.00
R - John Dalton		76 President	.558	.00
81 Governor	.760	77 Governor	.321	.00
D - Charles Robb		80 President	.598	.00
85 Governor	.769	81 Governor	.782	.00
D - Gerald Balalies		84 President	.128	.08
89 Governor	.463	85 Governor	.264	.00
D - L. Douglas Wilder		88 President	.A53	.00
93 Governor	.602	89 Governor	.305	.00
R - George Allen		92 President	.526	.00

The 1973 race was between Mills Goodwin (R) and Henry Howell (Ind.).

Table 9
Alabama
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables		
		Beta	Weights	Significance
78 Governor	.395	74 Governor	.643	.00
D - James Forrest		76 President	.084	.40
82 Governor	.562	78 Governor	.160	.08
D - George Wallace		80 President	.673	.00
86 Governor	.894	82 Governor	.181	.00
R - Guy Hunt		84 President	.822	.00
90 Governor	.825	86 Governor	.071	.67
R - Guy Hunt		88 President	.835	.00
94 Governor	.801	90 Governor	.316	.04
R - James Forrest"		92 President	.593	.00

"James Forrest ran as a Democrat in 1978 and as a Republican in 1994.

Table 10
Georgia
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables		
		Beta	Weights	Significance
78 Governor	.359	74 Governor	.433	.00
D - George Busbee		76 President	.312	.00
82 Governor	.486	78 Governor	.122	.11
D - Joe Frank Harris		80 President	.611	.00
86 Governor	.573	82 Governor	.370	.00
D - Joe Frank Harris		84 President	.504	.00
90 Governor	.413	86 Governor	.122	.13
D - Zell Miller		88 President	.557	.00
94 Governor	.631	90 Governor	.205	.00
D - Zell Miller		92 President	.651	.00

Table 11
Louisiana
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables		
		Beta	Weights	Significance
83 Governor	.709	72 Governor	.229	.00
D - Edwin Edwards		80 President	.718	.00
91 Governor	.761	83 Governor	-.750	.00
D -Edwin Edwards"		88 President	1.275	.00
95 Governor	.602	91 Governor	.511	.00
R - Mike Foster		92 President	.377	.00

** Edwards' opponent was David Duke. Authors' Note: The 1979 governors race was left out of the equation because of problems of imputing the data.

Table 12
Mississippi
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables		
		Beta	Weights	Significance
79 Governor	.331	75 Governor	.136	.28
D - William Winter		76 President	.474	.00
83 Governor	.385	79 Governor	.314	.01
D - William Allain		80 President	.351	.02
87 Governor	.566	83 Governor	.217	.02
D - Ray Mabus		84 President	.610	.00
91 Governor	.661	87 Governor	.517	.00
R - Kirk Fordice*		88 President	.353	.00
95 Governor	.610	91 Governor	.694	.00
R - Kirk Fordice		92 President	.210	.01

current governor had overcome the incumbent in that year's election.

Table 13
South Carolina
R Squared Values for Governor and President

Dependent Variable	R Squared	Independent Variables		
		Beta	Weights	Significance
78 Governor	.493	74 Governor	.307	.08
D - Richard Riley		76 President	.439	.01
82 Governor	.789	78 Governor	.189	.04
D - Richard Riley		80 President	.755	.00
86 Governor	.877	82 Governor	.533	.00
R - Carroll Campbell		84 President	.503	.00
90 Governor	.870	86 Governor	-.147	.23
R-CarrollCampbell		88 President	1.060	.00
94 Governor	.767	90 Governor	.533	.00
R - David Beasley		92 President	.365	.04

An autoregression analysis found no time series problems with the equation.

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