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## A House Divided: Party Polarization on Social Welfare Issues

Recently, the general public and the media have paid much attention to an increasing polarization on welfare issues. As Everett Carl Ladd's (1995) survey illustrates in Figure 1, three quarters of the general population agreed on the role of government in welfare in 1988. However, this consensus

**Figure 1**

### Assessing Welfare Programs

Question: *Do you agree or disagree..., "It is the responsibility of the government to take care of the people who cannot take care of themselves?"*

	1988	1990	1994
Agree	23.71%	30.21%	41.84%
Disagree	76.29%	69.79%	58.16%

Adapted from: Everett Carl Ladd, "The 1994 Congressional Elections: the Post-Industrial Realignment Continues," p.12. Data source: Surveys by Princeton Survey Research Associates for the Times Mirror Center, latest that of July 12-27, 1994.

had disintegrated into a near polar split by 1994. Because the U.S. House of Representatives is supposedly most responsive to popular opinion, the research here uses the House to investigate possible determinants of this trend. I postulate that not only divided government and the decline of the conservative coalition, but also the "Contract With America" have contributed to the development of party unity--and its mirror opposite, party polarization--on welfare issues. I intend to demonstrate three points: (1) the New Deal "conservative coalition" has not declined, (2) that the unity of both parties has increased after the "Contract With America," and (3) that the Democrats remain consistently more unified than the Republicans despite the perception that Republicans are more unified as a result of their "Contract With America."

### Literature Review

Much of the current literature implies that divided government and the decline of conservative coalition votes are correlated with an increase in party polarization on welfare votes in the House. Divided government has characterized American politics during much of the last two and one-half decades (1968-1992), with the executive traditionally dominated by Republicans and the House by Democrats. Morris P. Fiorina (1991) illustrates that this trend is demonstrated not only at the federal level, but also at the state level. Due to this divided government, both parties work to strengthen their party unity so that they are better able to battle their fierce opposition. For instance, in the 1970s, the Democrats revised the procedure by which their Caucus elected committee chairs, thus holding their leaders accountable to the entire party membership and enforcing party unity. The Republicans have since responded with resolve to tighten their ranks. As the parties become more unified and galvanized they leave little room for compromise or moderate positions. In effect, they become polarized.

As party unity increases, the frequency of conservative coalition votes may be expected to decline because conservative Southern Democrats who used to vote with Republicans against Northern Democrats beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, now either vote liberally with their own party or convert to the Republican party (Cooper and Brady, 1981: 423). Some contend that the decline of conservative coalition votes is also attributable to the 1965 Voting Rights Act which enabled larger numbers of black voters to reach the polls, thus making southern representatives more accountable to the traditionally liberal segments of their constituencies. But, Fleisher (1993) finds that even when controlling for such constituency variables, such as increased percentage of black liberal voters, the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and party unity scores of Northern Democrats still rise. Table 1 demonstrates this trend from 1981 to 1987. While ADA and party unity scores for Southern Democrats increased approximately 30 and 23 points respectively, Northern Democrats increased about 10 points on each set of scores. This emphasizes the fact that Northern Democrats who were largely unaffected by the increase in liberal black voters still became more liberal for reasons other than the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

Table 2 illustrates this partisan galvanization in both parties. As Bond and Fleisher (1995) demonstrate, since the Johnson administration in the 1960s, the extremely partisan factions of both parties have increased approximately thirty points, while the two cross-pressured or moderate factions have substantially decreased. For these purposes, "cross-pressure" factions represent those groups who have conflicting and thus less polarized positions on the issue studied. Rebecca C. Morton (1993) contends that this polarization is even more likely when Representatives have incomplete information regarding voter policy preferences. Because of this party polarization, Agae Clausen argues that now "party is the best single predictor of voting" especially on welfare issues (Fishel, 1978: 275).

Table 1

Mean ADA and Party Unity Support Scores Northern and Southern Democrats 1981-1987

Southern Democrats

	ADA				Party Unity			
	1981	1983	1985	1987	1981	1983	1985	1987
Mean	31	53	45	61	56	66	77	79
Stand. Dev.	26	25	21	21	19	20	15	15
N	70	81	72	76	70	81	72	76

Northern Democrats

	ADA				Party Unity			
	1981	1983	1985	1987	1981	1983	1985	1987
Mean	76	85	87	79	83	89	90	91
Stand. Dev.	23	13	14	19	13	10	10	10
N	167	185	180	179	167	185	180	197

Source: Richard Fleisher, 1993: 332

Theoretical Logic

Many authors agree with Clausen that welfare issues produce the greatest level of party polarization. Indeed, Bond and Fleisher (1995) find that when Congress voted on domestic issues such as welfare in 1993, Democrats supported the liberal position 54% of the time--twice that of Republicans. In other areas, Democrats and Republicans are more likely to support a moderate position thus indicating a decrease in party polarization as issues becomes less domestic. Because the positions of Republicans and Democrats are so divergent on welfare issues, their votes on such issues will probably be more partisan and polarized. Therefore, divided government and the decline of the conservative coalition may exacerbate party polarization on welfare votes in the House.

The "Contract With America" is a product of the Republican party which represents the culmination of divided government. It not only synthesized the Republican agenda and promoted party organization, but its portrayal of a unified force intimidated Democrats. Ladd (1995) notes that, although the "Contract With America" includes mostly rules changes for House procedure, it created the perception that Republicans were unified conservatively on every front, including welfare. This was accomplished by focusing the chaos of the 1994 Republican House takeover into a scheduled legislative agenda. The "Contract With America" publicized the Republicans' position on many issues, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich successfully brought these issues to a floor vote as promised. This organization was especially impressive considering that Republicans had not been in positions of chamber leadership for many decades, and that 32% of their party were freshman (Ornstein and Schenkenberg, 1995: 187). Due to the importance of the

"Contract With America" and its role in the Republican takeover, this study investigates the years immediately before and after the event.

The success of this type of initiative by the Republican leadership reflects high party unity. Indeed, according to Cooper and Brady (1981), the "impact of institutional context on leadership behavior is primarily determined by party strength." The "Contract With America" highlights the trend of increasing party unity in the House. According to Charles O. Jones (1968), the Republicans historically attained success in this endeavor precisely because they parlayed their electoral majority into a procedural majority or "those necessary to organize the House for business" as well as the substantive majority or "those necessary to pass legislation."

Ornstein and Schenkenburg (1995) further point out that the Republicans' small majority of 230 requires them to maintain cohesiveness in order to fulfill the agenda promised in the "Contract With America" (Ornstein and Schenkenburg, 1995). Jones' description of the Cannon Speakership of the early 1900s also applies to the mentality required to sustain the high degree of partisanship today: "Those members who reject the party leadership are rejecting the Republican party and its mandate from the people to manage the House and its work" (Jones, 1968). This trend of ever-tightening party unity resembles that of an arms race, with each side attempting to out-do the other until eventually they galvanize into diametric opposition with no room for moderate positions. Therefore, divided government and increased party unity culminating in the "Contract With America" may indicate increased party polarization on welfare votes.

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However, these national-level explanations for increased party polarization can miss the broader picture. Fiorina (1991: 646) points this out when he contends that "trends in state elections parallel to those in national elections raise suspicions that more general forces are at work and that existing explanations of divided government may be too level-

specific." National-level explanations in the American context also fail to account for party polarization more generally. For instance, if divided national government indicates polarization, then why does polarization occur in parliamentary systems such as England where divided government does not occur? This research acknowledges these facts and therefore merely attempts to identify possible causal factors at the national level only.

## Methodology

This study covers the 103rd and 104th Congresses which come directly before and after the Republican takeover of the House and the "Contract With America." For, if polarization were ever to occur, it would be at this juncture. The unit of analysis used will be House roll-call votes from 1993 to 1995. For the purposes of this study, welfare votes consist of partisan votes on issues like hunger, homelessness, Health and Human Services, as well as entitlements including Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, and Medicaid. But they do not include abortion, veterans' benefits, Housing and Urban Development, or procedural votes.

Procedural votes do not always reflect the actual conservative or liberal position of the House member. For instance, a Democrat may be in favor of a liberal welfare bill, but if the Republican Rules Committee members impose restricting debate and amending procedures, then the Democrat will be forced to vote against the bill. It appears, then, that the Democrat has voted against the liberal welfare bill when in actuality she has voted against the conservative rules parameters.

Three votes were chosen for each year of the study, culminating in a total of six votes for the 103rd Congress and three votes for the 104th Congress. Those for the 103rd Congress are as follows.

### 1993

HR920: Exempting unemployment compensation extensions from pay-as-you-go restrictions

HR2518: Appropriating funds for Health and Human Services

HR3167: Extending unemployment services

### 1994

HR4606: Appropriating funds for Health and Human Services

HR8: Re-authorizing WIC, school lunch, and other nutrition programs until 1998

HR4604: Establishing procedures for controlling entitlement expenditures

Unfortunately, HR4606 and HR8 were ultimately dropped from the study because a majority of Democrats voted with a majority of Republicans, therefore violating the requirements of a party unity vote. This results in a total of 4 votes for the 103rd Congress. Those votes selected from the 104th Congress are as follows.

### 1995

HR4: Overhauling the welfare program

HR1976: Capping participation in the WIC program

HR2425: Establishing procedures for controlling entitlement expenditures.

The Representatives' positions on these votes are recorded in SPSS along with their party and region. Every liberal vote is scored as a 1 and every conservative vote is scored as a 0, thus establishing a welfare index. If a representative voted liberally on every issues in the 103rd Congress, she receives a score of 4 because the maximum liberal score is 4.0 for the 103rd Congress and 3.0 for the 104th Congress. The most conservative score for both Congresses is 0.0

## Data Analysis

In the 103rd Congress, conservative coalition levels were very low. Congressional Quarterly reports that for the House alone, the conservative coalition existed on 44 out of 597 votes in 1993 and 36 out of 497 votes in 1994 to equal a 7% appearance (Almanac, 1994).

As demonstrated by the following tables, the level of party polarization was as high as the conservative coalition scores were low. Table 3 shows

Table 3

HR920 Unemployment Compensation 1993

	Republican	Democrat	Total
Conservative Unemployment vote	84.43%	8.9%	(163) 39.3%
Liberal Unemployment vote	15.6%	91.1%	(252) 60.7%
Total	(167) 40.2%	(248) 59.5%	(415) 100%

*Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V = .75, Significant at .01)*

that votes on HR920 resulted in 91.1% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing 84.4% of Republicans voting conservatively. More Republicans than Democrats defected. Table 4 shows a similar pattern for HR2518 with 93% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing only two-thirds of Republicans who voted conservatively.

Table 4

HR2518 Health and Human Services 1993

	Republican	Democrat	Total
Conservative HHS Appropriations vote	62.1%	7.0%	28.9% (123)
Liberal HHS Appropriations vote	37.9%	93.0%	71.1% (302)
Total	39.8% (169)	60.2% (256)	100.0% (425)

*Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.59, significant at .01.*

Likewise, in Table 5 HR3167 saw 92.8% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing only about half of Republicans voting conservatively. HR2518 with 93% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing only two-thirds of Republicans who voted conservatively. Likewise in Table 5, HR3167 saw 92.8% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing only about half of Republicans voting conservatively.

Table 5

HR3167 Unemployment Services 1993

	Republican	Democrat	Total
Conservative Unemployment ext vote	50.3%	7.2%	24.4% (96)

Liberal Unemployment ext vote	49.7%	92.8%	75.6% (297)
Total	39.9% (157)	30.0% (236)	100.0% (393)

*Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.49, significant at .0.1.*

Table 6 illustrates the same thing for 1994: 94.4% of Democrats voted liberally and again opposed about half of Republicans who voted conservatively. These findings show that party unity for Democrats was very high, usually approximating a 9 to 1 ratio of party supporters to party defectors. However, Republicans were not as unified with their highest ratio approximating 8 to 2 and falling as low as 1 to 1.

Table 6

HR4604 Health and Human Services 1994

	Republican	Democrat	Total
Conservative Entitlement Vote	55.7%	5.6%	25.5% (107)
Liberal Entitlement Vote	44.3%	94.4%	74.5% (312)
Total	39.9% (167)	60.1% (252)	100.0% (419)

*Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.56, significant at .01.*

Finally, the indices for the 103rd Congress are displayed in Table 7. The number of Democrats who always voted liberally were nearly 3.5 times greater than the number of Republicans who always voted conservatively. But, the two most conservative categories only equal 23.9% while the two most liberal categories equal 66.4%. All of these tables are statistically significant at the .01 level.

Table 7

Indices for the 103rd Congress

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.00	28.2%	0.0%	11.3% (42)
1.00	30.2%	0.9%	12.6% (47)
2.00	18.8%	3.6%	9.7% (36)
3.00	15.4%	18.8%	17.5% (65)
4.00	7.4%	76.7%	48.9% (182)

*Significant at .01.*

As of 25 November 1995, the conservative coalition existed on 102 out of 821 House votes for the 104th Congress, or 12.4%. This is obviously higher than the 7% for the 103rd Congress. Even though these figures contradict the theoretical logic by showing an increase rather than a decrease in the appearance of the conservative coalition thus far, the 104th Congress still demonstrates more party polarization than that of the 103rd Congress.

The results for HR1976 in Table 8 echo those of the 103rd Congress with 99.5% Democrats voting liberally and opposing only 64.3% of Republican who voted conservatively.

Table 8

HR1976 WIC Program 1995

	Republican	Democrat	Total
Conservative WIC Cap Vote	64.3%	0.5%	34.8% (147)
Liberal WIC Cap Vote	35.7%	99.5%	65.2% (276)
Total	53.7% (227)	46.3% (196)	100% (423)

*Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.66, significant at .01.*

Virtually no Democrats, but nearly a third of Republicans defected. But, for HR4 in Table 9, 95.5% of Democrats voted liberally and opposed 96.6% of Republicans who voted conservatively. HR2425 in Table 10 is also highly polarized with 97.5% of Democrats voting liberally and opposing 97% of Republicans voting conservatively.

Table 9

HR4 Welfare Overhaul 1995

	Republican	Democrat	Total
Conservative Welfare Vote	96.6%	4.5%	54% (234)
Liberal Welfare Vote	3.4%	95.5%	46% (199)
Total	53.6% (233)	46.2% (200)	100% (433)

*Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.92, significant at .01.*

Finally, the indices for the 104th Congress are located in Table 11. A far greater percentage of Republicans were strictly conservative than in the 103rd Congress with 61.7% voting conservatively here.

Table 10

HR2425 Entitlement Expenditures 1995

	Republican	Democrat	Total
Conservative Medicare Vote	97.0%	2.5%	53.5% (231)
Liberal Medicare Vote	3.0%	97.5%	46.5% (201)
Total	53.6% (233)	46.1% (199)	100% (432)

*Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.94, significant at .01*

Table 11

Indices for the 104th Congress

	Republican	Democrat	Total
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0.00	61.7%	0.0%	33.4% (140)
1.00	35.2%	1.0%	19.6% (82)
2.00	2.6%	5.2%	3.8% (16)
3.00	0.4%	93.8%	43.2% (181)
Total	54.2% (227)	45.8% (192)	100% (419)

*Chi Square Measure (Cramer's V)=.96, significant at .01.*

Democrats remained high in the strictly liberal category with 93.8%. However, this time the scales are more polarized with 53% in the two most conservative categories and 47% in the two most liberal categories. Obviously, these votes are not necessarily representative of all votes, but they are consistent with the Congressional Quarterly's General Report and its statistics on party unity and partisanship for the first session of the 104th Congress.

The conservative coalition scores do not resonate with the theoretical logic. To date, the scores have risen approximately five points in the House from the 103rd to the 104th Congresses. Even though this time frame is only a snapshot of a long-term trend of polarization, the data here shows that increased party polarization is not necessarily determined by a decrease in conservative coalition votes. However, this increase in conservative coalition votes may be due to the fact that it measures all conservative coalition votes, not just those on welfare issues. Despite these findings, other components of the theoretical logic have not been disproved. In fact, party polarization on these welfare votes increased after the "Contract With America" and the Republican takeover of the House. The Democrats maintain a higher degree of party unity than Republicans on these welfare votes both in the 103rd Congress when they held the majority as well as in the 104th Congress when they were in the minority. They consistently had approximately 90% party unity and very few defectors. This is underscored by the heavily-weighted liberal indices for Democrats in both Congresses.

The Republicans became more unified in the 104th Congress when they held the majority as compared to their divisiveness in the 103rd Congress when in the minority. Their party unity rose from nearly 50% in the 103rd Congress to reach above 90% for two out of the three votes in the 104th Congress. They were never as heavily weighted toward conservatism as Democrats were toward liberalism on the welfare indices. But, because both parties became more unified, they left little room for moderate positions or compromise, thus increasing party polarization.

A regional analysis of the data reveals a similar pattern. Table 12 in the Appendix indicates that all regions were weighted toward the liberal end of the index, but the Northeast and East regions had the highest liberal to conservative index ratio with the two most liberal and the two most conservative categories equaling approximately 8:2. Conversely, the Midwest showed the most conservative index for the 103rd Congress with an approximate 1:1 ratio. The Southwest and East were ultimately dropped from the individual regional analysis due to their low sample size.

In the individual regional examination, Table 13 reveals that in the South, Republicans were split with the two most liberal categories equaling 14.6% and the two most conservative equaling 65.9%, but the Democrats were a little more galvanized with the liberal categories totaling 71.5% and conservative totaling 2.9%. The West is a bit more unified for Republicans with the liberal faction totaling 10% and the conservative end of the index juggernaut 79%. Democrats are again very unified with all votes in the two most liberal index categories. The Northeast, displayed in Table 15, again shows more unity by Democrats than Republicans with all Democrats in most liberal categories and even Republicans weighted toward the liberal end of the index. Finally, Table 16 shows great polarization in the Midwest with 65% of Republicans in the two most conservative categories and all Democrats in the most liberal categories. All of these cross-tabulations are statistically significant at the .01 level.

Tables 17 through 21 display the regional findings for the 104th Congress. The overall regional analysis indicates more polarization than in the 103rd Congress: this time, the Northeast and East are liberally-dominated, the West is split down the middle, and the South and Southwest are conservatively-dominated. Once again, the Southwest and East are dropped from the individual examination due to their low sample size.

The remaining regions show higher party polarization than those of the 103rd Congress, supporting the theoretical logic that party polarization may be indicated by divided government and the "Contract With America." Table 18 shows the complete unity of Southern Republicans with all in the two most conservative index categories. Unusually, this time Democrats are the least unified with all but 3.3% in the two most liberal categories. Table 19 indicates the polarization of the West with almost all Republicans in the two most conservative categories and all Democrats in the two most liberal categories. In the Northeast in Table 20, all Democrats were once again in the two most liberal categories, while

the Republicans had only 88.9% in the two most conservative categories. Finally, in the Midwest, Table 21 indicates another complete polar split. Thus, not only is the general regional analysis more polarized in the 104th Congress, so are the individual regions of the South, West, Northeast, and Midwest. The Democrats are unified in every region for both Congresses, but the Republicans show a marked increase in unity, moving from moderate splits in the 103rd Congress to near absolute unity in all regions for the 104th Congress, thus augmenting party polarization on welfare issues.

## Conclusion

The degree of partisanship demonstrated by the House after the "Contract With America" does increase despite the fact that conservative coalition scores increase rather than decrease as expected. But, even though divided government and the "Contract With America" may indicate party galvanization, Republicans do not show the same degree of partisanship on these welfare votes as Democrats either by region or as a whole. This contradicts the perception that the Republican party is a disciplined juggernaut that remains unified under all circumstances. Apparently, the perception that the "Contract With America" is the ultimate unifying force for the ultimately unified party is mistaken. For, it is the Democrats, and not the Republicans who show the most cohesiveness in these particular instances.

## Further Expansion

This research design can be expanded into at least two directions. It could test the theory forwarded by Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright in "Voters, Candidates, and Issues In Congressional Elections" that the most moderate Representatives come from the most marginal districts and the most extreme Representatives come from the safest districts. In accordance with that theory, the design could investigate whether or not the Representatives from the most marginal districts have the most moderate positions on welfare issues, and the Representatives with the greatest chance of getting re-elected easily have the most extreme positions on such issues. Another option is to expand this longitudinal study laterally to compare the votes of Representatives on foreign policy and budget issues to those on welfare for the 103rd and 104th Congresses to see if welfare votes truly are more polarized than other types of votes.

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Appendix

Table 12  
The 103rd Congress

Index	South	S.West	West	N.East	Midwest	East	Total
0.0	13.5%	14.3%	9.2%	3.7%	17.4%	9.1%	11.3% (42)
1.0	12.6%	0.0%	22.4%	6.2%	12.8%	0.0%	12.6% (47)
2.0	10.8%	14.3%	3.9%	7.4%	15.1%	9.1%	9.7% (36)
3.0	22.5%	14.3%	18.4%	19.8%	7.0%	27.3%	17.5% (65)
4.0	40.5%	57.1%	46.1%	63.0%	47.7%	54.54%	48.9% (182)
Total	29.8% (111)	1.9% (7)	20.4% (76)	21.8% (81)	23.1% (86)	3.0% (11)	100% (372)

Table 13  
The South

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.0	36.6%	0.0%	13.5% (15)
1.0	29.3%	2.9%	12.6% (14)
2.0	19.5%	5.7%	10.8% (12)
3.0	12.2%	28.6%	22.5% (25)
4.0	2.4%	62.9%	40.5% (45)
Total	36.9% (41)	63.1% (70)	100% (111)

Significance = .01

Table 14  
The West

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.0	23.3%	0.0%	9.2% (7)
1.0	56.7%	0.0%	22.4% (17)
2.0	10.0%	0.0%	3.9% (3)
3.0	6.7%	26.1%	18.4% (14)
4.0	3.3%	73.9%	46.1% (35)
Total	39.5% (30)	60.5% (46)	100% (76)

Significance = .01

Table 15  
The Northeast

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.0	9.4%	0.0%	3.7% (3)
1.0	15.6%	0.0%	6.2% (5)
2.0	18.8%	0.0%	7.4% (6)
4.0	21.9%	89.8%	63.0% (51)
Total	39.5% (32)	60.5% (49)	100% (81)

Significance = .01

Table 16  
The Midwest

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.0	37.5%	0.0%	17.4% (15)
1.0	27.5%	0.0%	12.8% (11)
2.0	25.0%	6.5%	15.1% (13)
3.0	7.5%	6.5%	7.0% (6)
4.0	2.5%	87.0%	47.7% (45)
Total	46.5% (40)	53.5% (46)	100% (86)

Significance = .01

Table 17  
The 104th Congress

Index	South	S.West	West	N.East	Midwest	East	Total
0.0	38.8%	60.0%	40.0%	18.1%	34.4%	20.0%	33.4% (140)
1.0	17.9%	20.0%	12.0%	24.5%	24.0%	10.0%	19.6% (82)
2.0	3.7%	0.0%	2.7%	6.4%	2.1%	10.0%	3.8% (16)
3.0	39.6%	20.0%	45.3%	51.1%	39.6%	60.0%	43.2% (181)
Total	32.0% (134)	2.4% (10)	17.9% (75)	22.4% (96)	22.9% (96)	2.4% (10)	100% (419)

Significance = .01

Table 18

The South

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.0	70.3%	0.0%	38.8% (52)
1.0	29.7%	3.3%	17.9% (24)
2.0	0.0%	8.3%	3.7% (5)
3.0	0.0%	88.3%	39.6% (53)
Total	55.2% (74)	44.8% (60)	100% (134)

Significance = .01

Table 19

The West

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.0	75.0%	0.0%	40.0% (30)
1.0	22.5%	0.0%	12.0% (0)
2.0	2.5%	2.9%	2.7% (2)
3.0	0.0%	97.1%	45.3% (34)
Total	53.3% (40)	46.7% (35)	100% (75)

Significance = .01

Table 20

The Northeast

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.0	37.8%	0.0%	18.1% (17)
1.0	51.1%	0.0%	24.5% (23)
2.0	8.9%	4.1%	6.4% (6)
3.0	2.2%	95.9%	51.1% (48)
Total	47.9% (45)	52.1% (49)	100% (94)

Significance = .01

Table 21

The Midwest

Index	Republican	Democrat	Total
0.0	58.9%	0.0%	34.4% (33)
1.0	41.1%	0.0%	24.0% (23)
2.0	0.0%	5.0%	2.1% (2)
3.0	0.0%	95.0%	39.6% (38)
Total	58.3% (56)	41.7% (40)	100% (96)

Significance = .01

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